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I. INTRODUCTION 
“Wal-Mart Received $200 Million in Subsidies Since 2004, Report 
Says.”1  This headline illustrates a compelling problem in the U.S. 
federal system—tax competition among the states.  A 2004 study 
detailed how Wal-Mart received over $1 billion in economic 
development subsidies from approximately 240 state and local 
governments for its retail stores as well as its distribution centers.2  Wal-
Mart, one of the world’s largest corporations, “presents itself as an 
entrepreneurial success story, yet it routinely gets big tax breaks, free 
land, cash grants, and other forms of taxpayer assistance.”3  The follow-
up report found that Wal-Mart continues to benefit from economic 
development subsidies, negotiating “[thirty-nine] deals worth more than 
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 1. John Buhl, Wal-Mart Received $200 Million in Subsidies Since 2004, Report Says, 44 ST. 
TAX NOTES 788, Doc. No. 2007-13417 (2007) (LEXIS). 
 2. Philip Mattera et al., Shopping for Subsidies: How Wal-Mart Uses Taxpayer Money, 32 ST. 
TAX NOTES 1001, 1002, Doc. No. 2004-11480 (2004) (LEXIS). 
 3. Buhl, supra note 1 (citing Press Release, Philip Mattera, Research Director, Good Jobs First 
(June 5, 2007)). 
08.0_KAYE_FINAL 10/29/2008  11:11:42 AM 
94 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57 
$200 million in . . . the past three years.”4  While both the United States 
and the European Union face the same problem of state tax competition, 
this Article explains why this scenario would be extremely unusual in the 
European Union and examines whether any lessons can be learned from 
its experience. 
 The United States and the European Union are arguably the most 
powerful and successful examples of federalism.  Founded in part 
because of the need for economic unity,5 both continue to struggle with 
the individual sovereignty of their subnational governmental units (the 
individual American States and the European Union Member States).6  
One part of this sovereignty is the power to provide subsidies to promote 
certain public policies.  Specifically, the states and Member States enjoy 
the power to provide these subsidies through various tax incentives such 
as investment tax credits. 
However, this power is not unlimited.  In an effort to establish a 
common market in both the United States and the European Union, the 
tax policy of one state cannot be discriminatory against other states in a 
way that interferes with commerce within the common market.7  
Although both systems adhere to this general principle, the United States 
                                                          
 4. Good Jobs First, Wal-Mart Continues to Benefit from Economic Development Subsidies; 
More Than $200 Million Documented Over Past Three Years, http://www.goodjobsfirst.org 
/news/article.cfm?id=142 (last visited Aug. 26, 2008).  See DAVID CAY JOHNSTON, FREE LUNCH: 
HOW THE WEALTHIEST AMERICANS ENRICH THEMSELVES AT GOVERNMENT EXPENSE (AND STICK 
YOU WITH THE BILL) 99–104 (2007) for an exposition of Wal-Mart’s policy of shopping for 
subsidies. 
 5. The United States was founded in 1787, in hopes of a solution to “the mutual jealousies and 
aggressions of the States” that had led to economic retaliation.  Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 
U.S. 511, 522 (1935) (citations omitted).  See generally THE FEDERALIST NO. 42 (James Madison); 2 
THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, 308 (Max Farrand ed., 1911); 3 id. at 478, 
547, 548.  The European Economic Community was founded in 1958 with the establishment of a 
common market in the hopes of so intertwining their economies that future war would be avoided.  
See Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, art. 2, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 
[hereinafter EEC Treaty].  “From the outset, the EU was partly meant to make war unthinkable 
inside Europe.”  Charlemagne: The Burden of History, ECONOMIST, May 19, 2007, at 59. 
 6. The Treaty of Maastricht established the European Union.  Treaty on European Union, art. 
1, Feb. 7, 1992, 1992 O.J. (C 191) 1 [hereinafter TEU].  The Treaty of Amsterdam, effective May 1, 
1999, amended the EEC Treaty and the TEU.  Treaty of Amsterdam, Amending the Treaty on 
European Union, the Treaties Establishing the European Communities and Certain Related Acts, 
Oct. 2, 1997, 1997 O.J. (C 340) 1.  The most recent revisions of the Treaty entered into force on 
February 1, 2003.  Treaty of Nice Amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties 
Establishing the European Communities and Certain Related Acts, Feb. 26, 2001, 2001 O.J. (C 80) 1 
[hereinafter Treaty of Nice].  On December 13, 2007, the Treaty of Lisbon was signed by the 
twenty-seven Member States.  Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the 
Treaty Establishing the European Community, 2007 O.J. (C 306) 1.  However, the Treaty also needs 
to be ratified by all twenty-seven Member States before it becomes effective.  Tony Barber, EU 
Weighs Future as Leaders Sign New Treaty, FIN. TIMES (U.K.), Dec. 14, 2007, at 2. 
 7. See infra text accompanying notes 11–13, 42–47. 
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and the European Union have considerably different approaches in 
tempering the ability of the states and Member States to provide 
subsidies through tax policy. 
Part II of this Article discusses differing theories of tax competition 
while Part III outlines the use of tax incentives in the United States and 
the European Union.  Part IV then describes the procedures in place in 
each of the respective “federal” systems to allow challenges to tax 
incentives that might obstruct the efficient functioning of the common 
market and examines the implications of the choices made.  Part V 
recommends a proposal based on lessons learned from the EU 
experience. 
Pursuant to the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution, Congress 
has the authority to regulate state tax competition.8  However, Congress 
has usually declined to exercise this authority.9  Generally, the federal 
government has adopted a laissez-faire attitude and has declined “to 
establish principles for state tax competition.”10  Although the Commerce 
Clause is phrased as an affirmative grant of power to Congress, the 
Commerce Clause has long been interpreted by the Supreme Court as 
also denying the states the ability to tax or regulate in any manner that 
would unduly burden interstate commerce.11  Thus, this dormant 
Commerce Clause doctrine limits a state’s ability to interfere with 
interstate commerce12 and implicitly prohibits state discrimination of 
interstate commerce.13  Modern Commerce Clause doctrine forbids 
                                                          
 8. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 [hereinafter Commerce Clause] (“The Congress shall have 
Power To . . . regulate Commerce . . . among the Several States.”). 
 9. See Kathryn L. Moore, State and Local Taxation: When Will Congress Intervene?, 23 J. 
LEGIS. 171, 182–204 (1997) (reviewing the legislative history of various bills prohibiting state 
taxation); see also Charles E. McLure Jr. & Walter Hellerstein, Congressional Intervention in State 
Taxation: A Normative Analysis of Three Proposals, 31 ST. TAX NOTES 721, 723–735, Doc. No. 
2004-3173 (2004) (LEXIS) (providing an overview of congressional intervention in state tax matters 
and proposals regarding Internet access taxes, sales tax streamlining, and business activity taxes). 
 10. Thomas F. Field, Tax Competition in Europe and America, 27 ST. TAX NOTES 1211, 1213 
(2003). 
 11. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 6-2, at 1030 (3d ed. 2000). 
It is now established beyond dispute that “the Commerce Clause was not merely an 
authorization to Congress to enact laws for the protection and encouragement of 
commerce among the States, but by its own force created an area of trade free from 
interference by the States. . . . [T]he Commerce Clause even without implementing legis-
lation by Congress is a limitation upon the power of the States.” 
Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm’n, 429 U.S. 318, 328 (1977) (citing Freeman v. Hewit, 329 
U.S. 249, 252 (1946)). 
 12. See generally TRIBE, supra note 11, § 6-2, at 1030. 
 13. See Mark Tushnet, Rethinking the Dormant Commerce Clause, 1979 WIS. L. REV. 125, 
130–31 (“Beyond the proscription of purposeful discrimination, the commerce clause has been held 
to authorize judicial invalidation of state laws that unduly burden interstate commerce.”). 
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nearly all discrimination on the basis of economic factors from sister-
states and is designed to preclude states from engaging in economic 
protectionism.14  Thus, tax subsidies that encourage investment within a 
state must comply with the dormant Commerce Clause.15 
On the other hand, in the United States, states are generally free to 
directly subsidize in-state activities16 under the “market-participant” 
exception.  “The ‘market-participant’ exception permits states acting as 
‘market participants’ as opposed to ‘regulators’—essentially when the 
state is engaged in ordinary buying or selling with taxpayer money—to 
make geographic distinctions the [dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine] 
would otherwise prohibit.”17  The Supreme Court has indicated that even 
direct monetary subsidies to in-state companies usually do not violate the 
Commerce Clause.18 
The 1988 Supreme Court case of New Energy Co. of Indiana v. 
Limbach explicitly reiterates this dichotomy:19 
The Commerce Clause does not prohibit all state action designed to 
give its residents an advantage in the marketplace, but only action of 
that description in connection with the State’s regulation of interstate 
commerce.  Direct subsidization of domestic industry does not  
 
 
                                                          
 14. Douglas Laycock, Equal Citizens of Equal and Territorial States: The Constitutional 
Foundations of Choice of Law, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 249, 269 (1992). 
 15. See generally ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 
401 (2d ed. 2002) (“Even if Congress has not acted or no preemption is found, the state or local law 
can be challenged on the ground that it excessively burdens commerce among the states.”). 
 16. See, e.g., Camps Newfound/Owatonna v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 591 (1997) 
(“Direct subsidization of domestic industry does not ordinarily run afoul of [the Commerce Clause].” 
(citing New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 278 (1988))).  For an example of a 
prohibited subsidy see W. Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 204–05 (1994) (holding a 
Massachusetts tax on all milk dealers unconstitutional because its impact was identical to that of a 
discriminatory tax as the tax revenues were used to subsidize in-state dairy farmers). 
 17. Brannon Denning, Is the Dormant Commerce Clause Expendable?  A Response to Edward 
Zelinsky, 77 MISS. L.J. 623, 626 n.17 (2007); see also David S. Bogen, The Market-Participant 
Doctrine and the Clear Statement Rule, 29 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 543 (2006) (“According to the 
market participant doctrine, however, the state does not violate the dormant Commerce Clause by 
favoring its own citizens and companies when it buys or sells goods or services.”).  See generally 
Dan T. Coenen, Untangling the Market Participant Exception to the Dormant Commerce Clause, 88 
MICH. L. REV. 395 (1989) (explaining the development of the rule, alternative approaches to the rule, 
and application of the rule). 
 18. See W. Lynn Creamery, 512 U.S. at 199 n.15 (“We have never squarely confronted the 
constitutionality of subsidies, and we need not do so now.  We have, however, noted that ‘[d]irect 
subsidization of domestic industry does not ordinarily run afoul’ of the negative Commerce Clause.  
In addition, it is undisputed that States may try to attract business by creating an environment 
conducive to economic activity, as by maintaining good roads, sound public education, or low 
taxes.”  (citations omitted)). 
 19. 486 U.S. 269 (1988). 
08.0_KAYE_FINAL 10/29/2008  11:11:42 AM 
2008] THE GENTLE ART OF CORPORATE SEDUCTION 97 
 
ordinarily run afoul of that prohibition; discriminatory taxation . . . 
does.20 
This dichotomy between the treatment of direct subsidies and tax 
subsidies under the dormant Commerce Clause has been severely 
criticized.21 
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has provided murky guidance for 
determining when violations of the clause have occurred and the case 
law on specific tax schemes has not established a clear pattern of 
precedent.22  Under the test spelled out in dicta in Complete Auto Transit, 
Inc. v. Brady, a tax on interstate commerce must meet four requirements 
to survive a constitutional challenge under the Commerce Clause.23  The 
third prong of this test, the ban on discrimination against interstate 
commerce, is the predominant basis upon which the Supreme Court has 
struck down state taxes in recent years.24  A tax law is discriminatory if it 
“tax[es] a transaction or incident more heavily when it crosses state lines 
than when it occurs entirely within the [s]tate.”25 
State tax incentives reward a corporation’s in-state activities and 
raise an important dormant Commerce Clause question that has yet to be 
answered by the Supreme Court.26  In fact, Professor Enrich noted in 
                                                          
 20. Id. at 278. 
 21. See, e.g., Edward A. Zelinsky, Restoring Politics to the Commerce Clause: The Case for 
Abandoning The Dormant Commerce Clause Prohibition on Discriminatory Taxation, 29 OHIO 
N.U.L. REV. 29 (2002).  Professor Zelinsky has concluded “that the time has come to scrap the 
dormant Commerce Clause prohibition on discriminatory taxation.  Since the judicially-created 
prohibition has served its historic purpose, to create a single common market of the United States, it 
can now safely be laid to rest.”  Id. at 29.  The Supreme Court’s distinction between discriminatory 
taxation, which is prohibited under their decisions, and equivalent direct government subsidies, 
which are generally permitted, is fundamentally incoherent because taxes and subsidies are often 
similar in design and effect.  Id. at 30–31. 
 22. David F. Shores, State Taxation of Interstate Commerce—Quiet Revolution or Much Ado 
About Nothing?, 38 TAX L. REV. 127, 128–29 (1982).  “This case-by-case approach has left ‘much 
room for controversy and confusion and little in the way of precise guides to the States in the exer-
cise of their indispensable power of taxation.’”  Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm’n, 429 U.S. 
318, 329 (1977) (quoting Nw. States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450 (1959)). 
 23. 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977); see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 15, at 435; RICHARD D. 
POMP & OLIVER OLDMAN, STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION 1-15 (4th ed. 2001).  The four 
requirements are: (1) the activity taxed has a “substantial nexus with the taxing [s]tate”; (2) the tax is 
fairly apportioned to reflect the degree of activity that occurs within the state; (3) the tax “does not 
discriminate against interstate commerce”; and (4) the tax “is fairly related to benefits provided by 
the [s]tate.”  Complete Auto Transit, Inc., 430 U.S. at 279. 
 24. TRIBE, supra note 11, § 6-16, at 1107. 
 25. Chem. Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334, 342 (1992) (citing Armco Inc. v. 
Hardesty, 467 U.S. 638, 642 (1984)). 
 26. Philip M. Tatarowicz, Federalism, The Commerce Clause and Discriminatory State Tax 
Incentives: A Defense of Unconditional Business Tax Incentives Limited to In-State Activities of the 
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1996, “[t]he Supreme Court’s calendar has included a steady diet of state 
tax cases raising Commerce Clause issues, but to date, the Court has not 
applied its Commerce Clause doctrine to a state [investment tax credit], 
to a jobs credit, or any of the other characteristic location incentives.”27  
While the Court consistently finds discriminatory tax schemes 
unconstitutional, the Court is reluctant to strike down positive tax 
incentives that favor local industry.28  Indeed, until the Cuno case 
discussed below,29 the Supreme Court had not seen “a challenge 
grounded in the claim that a state tax provision’s primary purpose or 
effect is to attract business to locate or expand in the state.”30 
Professors Hellerstein and Coenen note: “a tax which by its terms or 
operation imposes greater burdens on out-of-state goods, activities, or 
enterprises than on competing in-state goods, activities, or enterprises 
will be struck down as discriminatory under the Commerce Clause.”31  In 
Boston Stock Exchange, the Supreme Court stated: “No State, consistent 
with the Commerce Clause, may ‘impose a tax which discriminates 
against interstate commerce . . . by providing a direct commercial 
advantage to local business.’”32  Although this seems like an applicable 
standard that could produce consistent results, it has left much of the 
interpretation to the courts.  This is demonstrated by the Court’s general 
willingness to allow location tax incentives, which clearly favor one 
state’s businesses over another.33  This topic of tax competition between 
the American States has received much attention lately.34 
On March 1, 2006, the Supreme Court heard oral arguments in 
DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno,35 the appeal of a Sixth Circuit case.36  In 
Cuno, the Sixth Circuit ruled on two Ohio tax incentives stemming from 
                                                                                                                       
Taxpayer, 60 TAX LAW. 835, 837 (2007). 
 27. Peter D. Enrich, Saving the States From Themselves: Commerce Clause Constraints on 
State Tax Incentives for Business, 110 HARV. L. REV. 377, 407 (1996) [hereinafter Enrich, Saving 
the States]. 
 28. Id. at 407–08. 
 29. See infra notes 35–41 and accompanying text. 
 30. Enrich, Saving the States, supra note 27, at 381. 
 31. Walter Hellerstein & Dan T. Coenen, Commerce Clause Restraints on State Business 
Development Incentives, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 789, 793 (1996). 
 32. 429 U.S. 318, 329 (1977) (quoting Nw. Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 458 
(1959)). 
 33. See Enrich, Saving the States, supra note 27, at 407, and accompanying text. 
 34. See, e.g., James R. Rogers, The Law and Policy of State Tax Competition: Much Ado About 
Nothing?, 4 GEO. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 101 (2006). 
 35. Transcript of Oral Argument at 1, DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332 (2006) 
(Nos. 04-1704, 04-1724).  See JOHNSTON, supra note 4, at 85–94 for a discussion of the behind the 
scenes events that preceded the litigation. 
 36. Cuno v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 386 F.3d 738 (6th Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 545 U.S. 1165 
(2005), vacated in part and remanded, 547 U.S. 332 (2006). 
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an agreement between the City of Toledo and DaimlerChrysler to build a 
plant in Ohio.37  The Sixth Circuit held that the investment tax credit 
violated the Commerce Clause because it “discriminates against 
interstate economic activity by coercing businesses already subject to the 
Ohio franchise tax to expand locally rather than out-of-state.”38  
However, the court found the personal property tax exemptions 
constitutional because they did not favor in-state activity.39  Although the 
Supreme Court ultimately limited its holding in Cuno to the issue of 
standing,40 the discussion surrounding the case provides an excellent 
opportunity to compare and contrast the economic development policy in 
the United States with the state aid law in the European Union.41 
Like the United States, the European Union bars tax discrimination.42  
Article 12 of the Treaty Establishing the European Community (“EC 
Treaty”) explicitly states that “any discrimination on grounds of 
nationality shall be prohibited.”43  Generally speaking, Member States 
are not permitted to pass national legislation that distinguishes between 
domestic and foreign persons, goods, services, or capital.44  These 
restrictions are part of the four fundamental freedoms espoused by the 
EC Treaty.45  According to the jurisprudence of the European Court of 
Justice, the “Four Freedoms” are directly applicable,46 permitting 
economic operators to challenge the validity of national law, including a 
tax law.47  The European Court of Justice has taken an expansive 
                                                          
 37. Cuno, 386 F.3d. at 741–48. 
 38. Id. at 743, 746. 
 39. Id. at 747. 
 40. Cuno, 547 U.S. at 338. 
 41. E.g., Deborah H. Schenk, The Cuno Case: A Comparison of U.S. Subsidies and European 
State Aid, 1 EUR. ST. AID Q. 3 (2006); Diane P. Wood, Cuno v. DaimlerChrysler, Inc.: State ‘Aids’ 
from an American Perspective, 1 EUR. ST. AID Q. 3 (2007); Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Passport to 
Toledo: Cuno, the World Trade Organization and the European Court of Justice, TAX NOTES, Dec. 
26, 2005, at 1661. 
 42. Tracy A. Kaye, Tax Discrimination: A Comparative Analysis of U.S. and EU Approaches, 
in COMPARATIVE FISCAL FEDERALISM 191, 212–13 (Reuven S. Avi-Yonah et al. eds., 2007) 
[hereinafter Kaye, Discrimination]. 
 43. Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community, art. 12, 2002 
O.J. (C 325) 43 [hereinafter EC Treaty] (incorporating changes made by Treaty of Nice art. 87).  See 
generally Kaye, Discrimination, supra note 42. 
 44. A number of provisions within the EC Treaty prohibit measures that discriminate or restrict 
these fundamental freedoms.  Wolfgang Schön, State Aid in the Area of Taxation, in EC STATE AIDS 
241, 244 (Leigh Hancher et al. eds., 3d ed. 2006) [hereinafter Schön, State Aid]. 
 45. EC Treaty, supra note 43, art. 14. 
 46. Case 26/62, NV Algemene Transport - en Expedite Onderneming van Gend & Loos v. 
Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen, 1963 E.C.R. 1, ¶ 12. 
 47. SERVAAS VAN THIEL, EU CASE LAW ON INCOME TAX at 4–9 (2001); see BEN J.M. TERRA 
& PETER J. WATTEL, EUROPEAN TAX LAW 32–34 (5th ed. 2008). 
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approach to evaluating the validity of tax regimes, and the resulting case 
law “illustrate[s] how the tax treatment of losses in cross-border 
situations, exit taxation, taxes on transfer of assets, withholding taxes on 
cross-border income, anti-abuse rules as well as inheritance taxes can all 
constitute tax obstacles to the internal market.  And these are just a few 
examples.”48 
Unlike the U.S. Constitution, the EC Treaty also explicitly prohibits 
state aid because the founders believed that state aid distorts competition 
within the common market.49  “State aid control comes from the need to 
maintain a level playing field for all undertakings active in the Single 
European Market, no matter in which Member State they are 
established.”50  In general, state aid is financial support given by a 
government to a certain business sector, enterprise, or geographic region 
through either direct or indirect transfer of resources.51 
Specifically, Article 87(1) states that “any aid granted by a Member 
State or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or 
threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the 
production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between 
Member States, be incompatible with the common market.”52  Therefore, 
state aid selectively favors certain undertakings for the production of 
certain goods, while general aid assists all sectors or industries.  The first 
measure is prohibited; the second is not.53 
The Treaty also provides exceptions to the general prohibition on 
state aid.  Paragraphs (2) and (3) of Article 87 list aid that is deemed 
“compatible” with the common market and aid that the Commission may 
declare “compatible.”54  For example, under Article 87(3), state aid can 
                                                          
 48. László Kovács, Eur. Comm’r for Taxation & Customs, Internal Market Without Direct Tax 
Obstacles: the Commission’s Proposals to Help Cross Border Activities in the European Union 
(Nov. 23, 2006), available at http://ec.europa.eu/commission_barroso/kovacs/speeches/dhik_ 
20061123.pdf; see Kaye, Discrimination, supra note 42, at 235–37. 
 49. EC Treaty, supra note 43, art. 87. 
 50. Phedon Nicolaides, The Economics of Granting and Controlling State Aid, in EC STATE 
AIDS 17, 19 (Leigh Hancher et al. eds., 3d ed. 2006) (citing European Commission, State Aid Action 
Plan: Less and Better Targeted State Aid, COM (2005) 107 final (June 7, 2005)). 
 51. CARLO PINTO, TAX COMPETITION AND EU LAW 100 (2003). 
 52. EC Treaty, supra note 43, art. 87(1); see also Wolfgang Schön, Taxation and State Aid Law 
in the European Union, 36 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 911, 919 (1999) [hereinafter Schön, Taxation] 
(discussing the application of Article 87(1) in tax matters). 
 53. See Fred C. de Hosson, Tax Facilities for State-Induced Costs under the EC State Aid 
Rules, 35 INTERTAX 719, 720 (2007) (“[A] ‘tax expenditure’ . . .  can only be construed as state aid 
if it leads to certain undertakings or the production of certain goods having an advantage.”); see also 
Martha O’Brien, Company Taxation, State Aid and Fundamental Freedoms: Is the Next Step 
Enhanced Co-operation?, 30 EUR. L. REV. 209, 224–27 (2005) (describing why the boundaries 
between selective and general provisions are yet to be defined). 
 54. EC Treaty, supra note 43, art. 87(2)–(3); see also GEORGE A. BERMANN ET AL., CASES AND 
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be held to be compatible if it is “aid to promote the economic 
development of areas where the standard of living is abnormally low or 
where there is serious unemployment.”55  Finally, Article 88 outlines 
notification, waiting, and adjudication procedures for all proposed 
measures of state aid with the potential to affect competition between the 
Member States.56  This has led to a number of decisions from the 
Commission as it pursues state aid investigations with respect to special 
national tax measures for multinationals.57  Many of these cases arise out 
of complaints made by the competitors of those firms that have been 
granted state aid.58  In fact, the Member State case law over the last 
decade reflects a steady increase in the number of competitors seeking to 
enforce state aid rules against Member States and beneficiaries in the 
national courts.59 
Although tax incentives were not the initial focus of the state aid 
restrictions, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) made it clear in dictum 
in Italy v. Commission that Article 87 applies to aid in any form.60  Thus, 
                                                                                                                       
MATERIALS ON EUROPEAN UNION LAW 1014–15 (2d ed. 2002). 
 55. EC Treaty, supra note 43, art. 87(3)(a). 
 56. Id. art. 88; BERMANN ET AL., supra note 54, at 1015.  For example: 
If, after giving notice to the parties concerned to submit their comments, the Commission 
finds that aid granted by a State or through State resources is not compatible with the 
common market . . . it shall decide that the State concerned shall abolish or alter such aid 
within a period of time to be determined by the Commission.  If the State concerned does 
not comply with this decision within the prescribed time, the Commission or any other 
interested State may, in derogation from the provisions of Articles 226 and 227, refer the 
matter to the Court of Justice direct. 
EC Treaty, supra note 43, art. 88(2). 
 57. See European Commission, Report on the Implementation of the Commission Notice on the 
Application of the State Aid Rules to Measures Relating to Direct Business Taxation, COM (2004) 
434 final (Feb. 9, 2004) [hereinafter 2004 Commission Report], available at http://ec.europa.eu 
/comm/competition/state_aid/others/business/rapportaidesfiscales_en.pdf (“[C]larifying and rein-
forcing the application of the state aid rules in order to reduce distortions of competition as they 
affect the single market and economic and monetary union.”).  See generally Pierpaolo Rossi-
Maccanico, State Aid Review of Member States’ Measures Relating to Direct Business Taxation, 2 
EUR. ST. AID Q. 229 (2004) [hereinafter Rossi-Maccanico, State Aid Review]. 
 58. BERMANN ET AL., supra note 54, at 1019 (“Firms frequently challenge a grant of state aid to 
their rivals, and typically they are accorded standing to do so.”); see id. at 141 (noting that 
competitors, as well as the prospective recipients of the state aid, have been held to have standing to 
sue to challenge Commission decisions addressed to the Member States in either the Court of First 
Instance or the Court of Justice). 
 59. Thomas Jestaedt et al., Study on the Enforcement of State Aid Law at National Level 43–44 
(Mar. 2006) available at http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/state_aid/studies_reports/study_ 
part_1.pdf. 
 60. The aim of Article 92 [now Article 87] is to prevent trade between Member States 
from being affected by benefits granted by the public authorities which . . . distort 
competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods.  
Accordingly, Article 92 does not distinguish between the measures of state 
intervention concerned by reference to their causes or aims but defines them in 
relation to their effects.  Consequently, the alleged fiscal nature or social aim of the 
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unlike in the United States, there is no incoherence in EU law with 
respect to the treatment of tax measures versus direct subsidies.  The 
analysis and the outcome will be the same regardless of the aid 
instrument that is chosen.  Tax measures are state aid if the state grants 
the recipients a fiscal advantage that affects competition and trade 
between the Member States.61  The tax measure must also be specific or 
selective and not a part of the general overall tax system.62  The ECJ has 
clarified that tax measures are specific if they differentiate between 
enterprises that are in legally and factually comparable situations.63 
In 1998, the European Commission and European Council began 
extensively utilizing these state aid restrictions to regulate the tax 
policies of the individual Member States.64  Mario Monti (previous 
Commissioner for Internal Market and Taxation) was appointed 
Commissioner for Competition,65 and brought his experience in the area 
of taxation and the internal market to bear on the use of the state aid laws 
as a way to promote the internal market.66  In 2001, he commenced 
formal investigation procedures under Article 88 with respect to eleven 
national tax provisions.67  Thus, the European Union is now explicit in 
restricting state aid that is provided through certain tax incentives or tax 
reductions.68  If the tax exemptions affect industries or regions, then  
 
                                                                                                                       
measure in issue cannot suffice to shield it from the application of Article 92. 
Case C-173/73, Italian Republic v. Comm’n, 1974 E.C.R. I-709, ¶ 13. 
 61. Pierpaolo Rossi-Maccanico, A Review of State Aid in Multinational Tax Regimes, 46 TAX 
NOTES INT’L 941, 943 (2007) [hereinafter Rossi-Maccanico, Review of State Aid]. 
 62. Id.  “Selectivity may derive from a legislative, regulatory, or administrative provision, or 
from a discretionary practice on the part of the tax authorities.”  Id. 
 63. Id. at 957 (citing Case C-143/99, Adria-Wien Pipeline GmbH and Wietersdorfer & 
Peggauer Zementwerke GmbH v. Finanzlandesdirektion für Kärnten, 2001 E.C.R. I-8365). 
 64. Schön, State Aid, supra note 44, at 242 (citing the Commission Notice on the Application of 
the State Aid Rules to Measures Relating to Direct Business Taxation, 1998 O.J. (C 384) 3 that 
describes its approach to tax incentives [hereinafter Commission Notice on State Aid]). 
 65. Chuck Gnaedinger, New EU Commissioners Named; Monti’s Replacement Announced, 19 
TAX NOTES INT’L 359 (1999); see Profile of Mario Monti, European Commission, 
http://ec.europa.eu/archives/commission_1999_2004/monti/cv_en.html (last visited Aug. 26, 2008). 
 66. Schön, State Aid, supra note 44, at 242; see Maria Rehbinder, Recent Developments in 
Commission State Aid Policy and Practice, in THE LAW OF STATE AID IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 
117, 118 (Andrea Biondi et al. eds., Oxford University Press 2003) (noting that Commissioner Monti 
indicated that strict state aid policy would be a political priority); Mario Monti, Editorial: The Single 
Market and Beyond: Challenges for Tax Policy in the European Union, 6 EC TAX REV. 2, 2–3 
(1997). 
 67. TERRA & WATTEL, supra note 47, at 202, 207 (discussing investigations and injunctions 
occurring during Monti’s tenure). 
 68. Overview: What Is State Aid?, http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/state_aid/overview 
/what_is_state_aid.html (last visited Aug. 26, 2008).  See generally 2004 Commission Report, supra 
note 57. 
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Article 87 and the law of state aid apply.69  This means that Member 
States are required to notify any new aid to the Commission.70 
Regardless of all of these prohibitions, Member States continue to 
provide legal (and illegal) state aid through the form of tax incentives in 
the belief that tax relief can stimulate a Member State’s economy and 
help it become a contributing member of the common market.71  In fact, 
approximately forty-five percent of state aid is allocated by means of tax 
measures granted by Member States and approved by the Commission.72 
The European Commission’s focus is on identifying those tax 
measures that constitute prohibited state aid.73  This is problematic, 
however, because Member States’ tax authorities’ actions are often 
hidden “due to their non-publicity and to the confidentiality assured to 
the taxpayers involved in negotiations with them or in an enforcement 
procedure of recovery of tax claims.”74  Of course, the first step is to 
distinguish between general tax measures and “selective” tax incentives 
in the form of reduced tax rates, tax holidays, investment credits, 
accelerated depreciation, etc.75  This process is analogous to the 
determination made in the United States as to whether a tax measure 
constitutes a “tax expenditure.”76  Further, Professor Schön notes that the 
key to determining if a tax measure is prohibited is whether the tax 
incentive is “normal,” “disadvantageous,” or “advantageous” to the 
taxpayer.77  Only the latter is considered state aid under Article 87.78 
 
                                                          
 69. STEPHEN WEATHERILL & PAUL BEAUMONT, EC LAW: THE ESSENTIAL GUIDE TO THE 
LEGAL WORKINGS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 405 (2d ed. 1995). 
 70. The Commission shall be informed, in sufficient time to enable it to submit its 
comments, of any plans to grant or alter aid.  If it considers that any such plan is not 
compatible with the common market having regard to Article 87, it shall without 
delay initiate the procedures provided for in paragraph 2.  The Member State 
concerned shall not put its proposed measures into effect until this procedure has 
resulted in a final decision. 
EC Treaty, supra note 43, art. 88(3). 
 71. E.g., Schön, Taxation, supra note 52, at 920–22. 
 72. European Commission, Studies and Reports, Chart: Share of Each Aid Instrument in Total 
Aid to Manufacturing and Services, 2004–2006, available at http://ec.europa.eu/comm 
/competition/state_aid/studies_reports/stat_tables.html (last visited Aug. 26, 2008); State Aid 
Scoreboard, at 38, COM (2007) 791 final (Dec. 13, 2007). 
 73. Ninth Survey on State Aid in the European Union, at 19, COM (2001) 403 final (July 18, 
2001). 
 74. PINTO, supra note 51, at 126–27. 
 75. Schön, Taxation, supra note 52, at 916–17, 920. 
 76. For a description of the tax expenditure concept, see generally STANLEY S. SURREY, 
PATHWAYS TO TAX REFORM: THE CONCEPT OF TAX EXPENDITURES (1973). 
 77. Schön, Taxation, supra note 52, at 922–23. 
 78. See id. at 920. 
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Both the Commission and the ECJ focus almost exclusively on the 
“effects” of a tax in order to determine whether it is prohibited state 
aid.79  Additionally, the Commission will allow tax incentives that are 
generally applicable but prohibit those that it considers to be 
exceptions.80  When determining whether a tax incentive constitutes 
prohibited state aid, the EC Treaty allows a Member State to adjust its 
general tax system, so long as it does not unfairly distort competition 
within the common market.81  It is also fully within the discretion of a 
Member State to employ disadvantageous taxes (tax disincentives).82  
Part II of this Article sets forth the current approaches to distinguishing 
between appropriate and inappropriate tax incentives. 
II. TAX COMPETITION 
A. European Union 
The Single European Act incorporated the objective of an internal 
market into the founding Treaty.83  The “internal market” is defined as 
“an area without internal frontiers in which the free movement of goods, 
persons, services and capital is ensured.”84  The original view of the 
Commission was that any disparity between the tax systems of the 
Member States had to be alleviated in order to optimize productivity 
within the European Community as differing tax systems could be one of 
those internal frontiers.85  Tax harmonization would improve neutrality 
and guarantee that companies located in nations because of efficiency of 
resources, not simply because of advantageous tax schemes.86  In 1990, 
the EC Commissioner for Taxation, Mrs. Scrivener, stated that the 
                                                          
 79. Id. at 922–23. 
 80. Commission Notice on State Aid, supra note 64, at 384/5. 
 81. Schön, Taxation, supra note 52, at 924. 
 82. E.g., id. at 922 (citing examples of increased taxes on tobacco or mineral oil). 
 83. Single European Act, art. 13, 1987 O.J. (L 169) 1. 
 84. EC Treaty, supra note 43, art. 14. 
 85. TAX COMPETITION IN EUROPE 4 (Wolfgang Schön ed., 2003).  For example, the Neumark 
Committee Report recommended a uniform split rate system of corporate taxation for the European 
Community.  EEC FISCAL AND FIN. COMM., TAX HARMONIZATION IN THE COMMON MARKET 
(Neumark Report) (July 8, 1962), reprinted in TAX HARMONIZATION IN THE COMMON MARKET 40 
(Commerce Clearing House, Inc. ed. & trans., 1963).  The van den Tempel Committee Report 
recommended a uniform classical system of corporate taxation.  A.J. VAN DEN TEMPEL, 
CORPORATION TAX AND INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (EEC Comm’n, 
Approximation of Legislation Series No. 15, 1970) at 41; see Commission White Paper on 
Completing the Internal Market, at 38, COM (85) 310 final (June 14, 1985) (urging the completion 
of ongoing work regarding the removal of tax obstacles). 
 86. TAX COMPETITION IN EUROPE, supra note 85, at 4. 
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European Commission had abandoned its goal of full harmonization of  
direct taxation for a more practical approach—convergence of the 
respective corporate tax systems.87 
Various studies such as the 1992 Ruding Report on corporate 
taxation were undertaken.88  Commissioner Scrivener established a 
committee of independent experts chaired by Mr. Ruding, a former 
Dutch Finance Minister, to identify future proposals on company 
taxation after 1992.89  The Ruding Committee considered the following 
questions: (1) whether the differences in corporate taxation among the 
Member States create distortions with respect to investment decisions 
and competition in the single market; (2) whether the distortions should 
be eliminated through Community measures or whether market forces 
and competition between national tax systems should be allowed to run 
their course; and (3) what specific Community measures are required to 
remove or mitigate these distortions.90  The Ruding Report concluded 
that the tax differences did distort the internal market and generated 
significant differences in the cost of capital.91  The Report contained 
many recommendations for legislative proposals to eliminate or reduce 
these distortions,92 but the Commission declared most of the 
recommendations to be too ambitious.93 
                                                          
 87. Commission Communication, Guidelines on Company Taxation, at 10, SEC (1990) 601 
final (Apr. 20, 1990) [hereinafter Guidelines on Company Taxation].  For example, the 1975 Draft 
Directive proposing a partial integration system was withdrawn in 1990.  See generally Proposal for 
a Council Directive Concerning the Harmonization of Systems of Company Taxation and of 
Withholding Taxes on Dividends, 1975 O.J. (C 253) 2 (withdrawn Apr. 18, 1990). 
 88. The EC Commissioner for Taxation, Mrs. Scrivener, issued a communication in 1990 
setting forth guidelines on company taxation and the measures thought necessary to establish the 
internal market.  Guidelines on Company Taxation, supra note 87, at 1. 
 89. Id. at 11–12.  See European Commission, Report of the Committee of Independent Experts 
on Company Taxation 11 (1992) [hereinafter Ruding Report]. 
 90. Ruding Report, supra note 89, at 11. 
 91. Id. at 196. 
 92. Although the Committee found that there had been some convergence of the Member 
States’ tax regimes, it decided that further action was needed at the Community level.  See generally 
id. at 143–97.  The priorities outlined in the Ruding Report were: (1) removing the discriminatory 
and distortionary features of each country’s tax system that impede cross-border business investment 
and shareholding; (2) setting a minimum statutory corporate tax rate and common rules for the tax 
base in order to limit excessive tax competition between the Member States; and (3) encouraging 
maximum transparency of any tax incentives granted by a Member State.  Id. at 13. Due to the 
Commission’s close scrutiny of the use of direct subsidies, the Ruding Committee expressed concern 
that Member States may instead resort to tax incentives.  Id. at 42.  The Committee stressed the need 
to ensure that hidden tax incentives, particularly those affecting the tax base, did not distort 
competition within the Community.  Id. 
 93. See Tracy A. Kaye, European Tax Harmonization and the Implications for U.S. Tax Policy, 
19 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 109, 146–47 (1996) (discussing the Commission’s divergent 
responses to the suggestions for the elimination of double-taxation and for tax harmonization (citing 
Commission of the European Communities, Commission Communication to the Council and to the 
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The Commission conducted another comprehensive study on 
corporate taxation in the European Union that was released in October 
2001.94  This Study found differences of more than thirty percentage 
points in the effective tax burden with respect to various cross-border 
investments within the European Union.95  Thus, companies have an 
incentive to make their investments in the country with the lowest tax 
burden for their situation, which is not necessarily the most economically 
efficient location.96  The Study made several recommendations for the 
coordination of tax policy, one of which was the development of a 
common consolidated tax base.97 
The goal of the Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base project 
(CCCTB) is to improve the efficiency of the internal market and create a 
business-friendly tax environment by minimizing compliance costs in 
cross-border activity.98  The benefits of a CCCTB-regime include: 
reduced tax compliance cost for businesses; lower tax administration cost 
for governments; the ability to offset cross-border profits and losses; the 
reduction of double taxation of foreign source income; increased tax 
transparency; and the elimination of transfer pricing disputes among 
participating countries.99 
The CCCTB creates a single tax base for all European group 
economic activity in an effort to eliminate tax differences among 
Member States.100  For example, a U.K. multi-national corporation with a 
company in France and Germany would not distinguish among its 
individual companies, but would calculate group profits collectively.101  
                                                                                                                       
European Parliament Subsequent to the Conclusions of the Ruding Committee Indicating Guidelines 
on Company Taxation Linked to the Further Development of the Internal Market, SEC (92) 1118 
final (June 24, 1992))).  The Commission endorsed only the extension of the scope of the Parent-
Subsidiary Directive, the Mergers Directive, and other less sensitive tax proposals.  Id. at 147–48. 
 94. European Commission, Company Taxation in the Internal Market, COM (2001) 582 final 
(Oct. 23, 2001) [hereinafter Company Taxation]. 
 95. Executive Summary, Company Taxation, supra note 94, at 5. 
 96. PINTO, supra note 51, at 47. 
 97. Company Taxation, supra note 94, at 375–77. 
 98. László Kovács, European Comm’r for Taxation & Customs, Keynote Address in the UK 
Houses of Parliament: The European Commission’s Project for a Common Consolidated Corporate 
Tax Base (CCCTB) (Sept. 28, 2006) (transcript available at http://ec.europa.eu 
/commission_barroso/kovacs/speeches/Speech_London_280906.pdf).  See generally Michel Aujean, 
The CCCTB Project and the Future of European Taxation, in 53 COMMON CONSOLIDATED 
CORPORATE TAX BASE (Michael Lang et al. eds., 2008). 
 99. Audio CD-ROM: Foreign Lawyers Forum, held by ABA Section of Taxation 2008 Midyear 
Meeting (Jan. 18, 2008) (on file with author). 
 100. Id.; see Thomas Neale, CCCTB: How Far Have We Got and What Are the Next Steps?, in 
53 COMMON CONSOLIDATED CORPORATE TAX BASE, supra note 98, at 39 (“Any initiative will be 
related to the tax base, and not the tax rate.”). 
 101. See Claus Staringer, Requirements for Forming a Group, in 53 COMMON CONSOLIDATED 
CORPORATE TAX BASE, supra note 98, at 115, 125. 
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This calculation would then be apportioned in accordance with another 
set of rules, and each Member State would tax its allocated base.102  
Thus, rather than having companies limit themselves to national 
operations in order to minimize costs of compliance with EU law, the 
CCCTB would facilitate cross-border operations and simplify EU 
taxation.103  Furthermore, an interesting side effect of the CCCTB is that 
it would also limit any tax incentives that are designed as base 
reductions, as all twenty-seven Member States must agree to the base. 
Although not all Member States agree with the implementation of 
the project, all twenty-seven participate in the working group responsible 
for evaluating the practical aspects of a common corporate tax base.104  
The goal of the European Commission is to present a “comprehensive 
Community legislative measure” at the end of 2008,105 followed by a 
directive in 2010.106 
Although tax harmonization is still considered desirable by the 
Commission, modern economic evaluation stresses the benefits that can 
be derived from healthy tax competition.107  The basic economic 
principle is that tax competition permits taxpayers to exert some 
                                                          
 102. Foreign Lawyers Forum, supra note 99.  Currently however, the CCCTB has not 
determined the allocation of the corporate tax.  This process is expected to be highly politicized.  Id. 
 103. European Commission, Directorate-General, Taxation and Customs Union, Progress to 
Date and Future Plans for the CCCTB, Brussels, Belgium, 19–20 (Nov. 20, 2006) [hereinafter 
Progress to Date]; see Wolfgang Schön, Group Taxation and the CCCTB, 48 TAX NOTES INT’L 
1071–72 (2007) (“[T]he uniform taxable base for groups impressively masters those frictions, which 
exist at present in the weak points of international group taxation.  There are also advantages that are 
based precisely on a Europe-wide uniformity, for example, a huge reduction of compliance costs, 
which are triggered by differences in content between the national profit measurement systems.”). 
 104. European Commission, Directorate-General, Taxation and Customs Union, Summary 
Record of the Meeting of the Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base Working Group, Brussels, 
Belgium (Aug. 31, 2006) at 1, available at http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/resources 
/documents/taxation/company_tax/common_tax_base/CCCTBWP037summary_en.pdf. 
 105. Progress to Date, supra note 103, at 19.  The Commission prepared a working paper that 
sets out a possible outline of the principles of a CCCTB to bring the various structural elements of 
the base together into a coherent set of rules.  See European Commission, CCCTB: Possible 
Elements of a Technical Outline, at 1 (July 26, 2007), available at http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_ 
customs/resources/documents/taxation/company_tax/common_tax_base/CCCTBWP057_en.pdf. 
 106. Foreign Lawyers Forum, supra note 99. However, in Commissioner Kovács’ speech to the 
IFA he stated: “I would rather present a perfectly elaborated and well justified product at the 
appropriate time than present an incomplete one just to meet an artificial deadline.” László Kovács, 
Eur. Comm’r for Taxation & Customs, Keynote speech at the Sixty-Second Congress of the 
International Fiscal Association 3 (Aug. 31, 2008), available at http://ec.europa.eu 
/commission_barroso/kovacs/speeches/2008/0831IFA.pdf. 
 107. See TAX COMPETITION IN EUROPE, supra note 85, at 4 (explaining that publications by the 
Commission still maintain tax harmonization as ideal); see also James R. Hines, Harmful Tax 
Competition and its Harmful Remedies, 50 BRIT. TAX REV. 209 (2006) (book review) (discussing 
criticisms of tax harmonization). 
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influence over governments’ tax policies.108  This theory was enunciated 
in 1956 by renowned economist Charles Tiebout.109  Tiebout set forth the 
concept of taxpayer influence known as “voting with the feet,” a premise 
that highlighted the positive effects of tax competition by concluding that 
taxpayers would move freely to find the most efficient balance of tax 
burden and government services.110 
Without competition, tax regimes are immune to market pressure, 
creating the possibility of oppressive tax schemes.  By contrast, when 
competition exists, taxpayers can move to another Member State if the 
tax regime in their current Member State is overly unfavorable.  This 
creates a “downward pressure” on the tax burden.111  Furthermore, tax 
competition encourages governments to seek the most efficient balance 
between the tax burden on taxpayers and the government services offered 
for those taxes.112 
In a 1996 memorandum, Mario Monti (as Commissioner for the 
Internal Market), stressed that unfair tax competition leads to an 
increased tax burden on labor resulting in higher unemployment in the 
European Union.113  The Monti Memorandum called for a more 
coordinated approach toward harmful tax competition as “the apparent 
defence of national fiscal sovereignty has gradually brought about a real 
loss of fiscal sovereignty by each Member State in favour of the markets, 
through tax erosion, especially on the more mobile tax bases.”114 
Subsequently, a 1996 Commission Report dealing with tax 
competition showed a higher relative weight of taxes on less-mobile 
personal income as compared to taxes on corporate income and 
consumption.115  The Report stated that this was partly due to harmful tax 
competition that had forced Member States to reduce taxes on capital and  
 
                                                          
 108. Field, supra note 10, at 1211. 
 109. Charles Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416, 418 (1956). 
 110. Id.  Tiebout theorized that the best way to ensure efficiency in taxation was to freely permit 
variance of tax regimes among communities, thereby allowing taxpayers to find their preferred 
position and ultimately forcing tax rates to the appropriate, balanced levels.  Id. at 420. 
 111. TAX COMPETITION IN EUROPE, supra note 85, at 6; Field, supra note 10, at 1211. 
 112. PINTO, supra note 51, at 10–11. 
 113. European Commission, Taxation in the European Union Discussion Paper for the Informal 
Meeting of ECOFIN Ministers, at 4, SEC (1996) 487 final (Mar. 20, 1996) (citing Commission White 
Paper on Growth, Competitiveness and Employment, COM (1993) 700 (Dec. 5, 1993) [hereinafter 
White Paper on Growth]). 
 114. PINTO, supra note 51, at 36 (citing White Paper on Growth, supra note 113). 
 115. European Commission, Taxation in the European Union: Report on the Development of 
Tax Systems, COM (1996) 546 final (Oct. 22, 1996) reprinted in 25 INTERTAX 23, 26 (1997). 
08.0_KAYE_FINAL 10/29/2008  11:11:42 AM 
2008] THE GENTLE ART OF CORPORATE SEDUCTION 109 
increase taxes on labor.116  In 1997, the Commission proposed adoption 
of a common policy to tackle harmful tax competition.117 
The Code of Conduct for Business Taxation was established by the 
Economy and Finance Council (ECOFIN)118 based on this 
recommendation from the European Commission with regard to the 
elimination of harmful tax competition.119  The Code is not binding on 
the Member States, but those adopting it agree to reduce any existing tax 
measures that constitute harmful competition and to refrain from 
instituting any similar measures in the future.120  Although not a legally 
binding document, the Code carries great political force.121 
What does the Code consider harmful?122  It sets forth the following 
considerations for evaluation: 
 
                                                          
 116. Id. 
 117. Schön, State Aid, supra note 44, at 242 (citing European Commission, Towards Tax 
Coordination in the European Union; A Package to Tackle Harmful Tax Competition, COM (1997) 
495 final (Oct. 15, 1997)). 
 118. Conclusions of the ECOFIN Council Meeting on 1 December 1997 Concerning Taxation 
Policy, 1998 O.J. (C 2) 1, 1. 
The Council of Ministers is comprised of representatives of the Member States, usually 
the ministers responsible for the subject matter under discussion . . . .  [T]he Member 
States’ Finance Ministers meet with respect to tax and other economic matters and are 
known as the Economy and Finance Council (ECOFIN) . . . .  In tax matters, the Council 
is the principal lawmaking body of the Community, but it can only act on a proposal from 
the Commission. 
Kaye, Discrimination, supra note 42, at 201 (citations omitted). 
 119. Resolution of the Council and the Representatives of the Governments of the Member 
States, Meeting Within the Council of 1 December 1997 on a Code of Conduct for Business 
Taxation, 1998 O.J. (C 2) 2, 2 [hereinafter Code of Conduct]. 
 120. Id. at 4.  Generally speaking, the Code of Conduct requires the following: (1) Member 
States must refrain from creating new “harmful” tax measures (known as standstill); (2) all existing 
tax policies must be examined for compliance—those policies that would be categorized as 
“harmful” by the Code must be amended to conform (known as rollback); (3) the signatories to the 
Code must inform other signatories of “harmful” policies—there must be transparency; and (4) the 
signatories to the Code and the Council participate in ongoing evaluation of policies by a tax policy 
group known as the Primarolo group.  Id.  Mrs. Primarolo is the Chair of the Code of Conduct 
Group.  See Council of the European Union, Code of Conduct Group, Code of Conduct (Business 
Taxation) Report to the ECOFIN Council, ¶ 9, 9655/06 FISC 73 (June 7, 2006) [hereinafter June 
2006 Report to ECOFIN] (“Mrs. Primarolo was re-appointed by common accord as the Chair of the 
Code of Conduct Group.”). 
 121. For example, Ireland repealed its preferential 10% tax rate for certain manufacturing 
activity and replaced the targeted incentive with an overall corporate tax rate of 12.5% in 2003.  
Michael Mikiciuk, Foreign Direct Investment Success in Ireland: Can Poland Duplicate Ireland’s 
Economic Success Based on Foreign Direct Investment Policies?, 14 U. MIAMI INT’L & COMP. L. 
REV. 65, 106 (2006). 
 122. Article A defines harmful tax measures as “ones that affect or may affect in a significant 
way the location of business activity in the [c]ommunity, without prejudice to member states 
prerogatives in the area of direct taxation.”  Rossi-Maccanico, Review of State Aid, supra note 61, at 
942 n.4 (citing the Code of Conduct, supra note 119, at 3). 
08.0_KAYE_FINAL 10/29/2008  11:11:42 AM 
110 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57 
• Are advantages accorded, either directly or indirectly, only to 
nonresidents? 
• Are these advantages isolated from the domestic market so that 
the national tax base is not affected? 
• Are advantages granted to a nonresident company without any 
real economic activity or presence in the regulating Member 
State? 
• Do the rules for profit determination depart from accepted 
international principles? 
• Does the tax regime lack transparency, either in law or in the 
administration of the law?123 
 
Article J of the Code of Conduct urged the Commission to strictly 
apply the state aid rules to those measures that were deemed to be 
harmful.124  Classifying a measure as harmful under the Code does not 
qualify that measure as state aid because the two criteria differ.125  
Therefore, state aid policy cannot replace Member States’ efforts to 
abolish harmful tax measures.126  A tax-policy group known as the 
Primarolo Group presented various reports that assessed 271 tax 
measures and found 66 of them to be harmful within the meaning of the 
Code of Conduct.127  Subsequent reports assessed both the offending 
states’ curtailment efforts as well as new Member States’ compliance 
with the Code of Conduct.128  In 1999, the Commission pursued eleven 
state aid investigations with respect to some of these “harmful” tax 
schemes.129 
For example, Greece had allowed certain foreign companies to 
establish offices or branches in Greece to conduct their companies’ 
                                                          
 123. Code of Conduct, supra note 119, at 3. 
 124. Rossi-Maccanico, Review of State Aid, supra note 61, at 942; see Code of Conduct, supra 
note 119, at 5 (“[The Council] commits itself to strict application of the aid rules.”). 
 125. 2004 Commission Report, supra note 57, at 17. 
 126. Id. at 17–18. 
 127. Council of the European Union, Code of Conduct Group, Code of Conduct (Business 
Taxation)—Report to the ECOFIN Council, at 2, 9427/05 FISC 55 (June 7, 2005) (on file with 
author); see Robert Goulder, Primarolo Group’s Report Identifies 66 Harmful Tax Regimes, 20 TAX 
NOTES INT’L 1283 (2000); see also Rossi-Maccanico, Review of State Aid, supra note 61, at 942. 
 128. June 2006 Report to ECOFIN, supra note 120, at 2 (noting that thirty measures were found 
to be harmful in acceding states and that twenty-seven rollbacks of such measures envisaged or 
already undertaken were adequate to bring the Member States into compliance) (on file with author); 
see Council of the European Union, Code of Conduct Group, Code of Conduct (Business 
Taxation)—Report to the ECOFIN Council, at 2, 9047/07 FISC 62 (June 5, 2007) (noting that 
Bulgaria and Romania, which acceded to the EU in 2007, had eight harmful measures). 
 129. See Rossi-Maccanico, Review of State Aid, supra note 61 at 945. 
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business outside of Greece.130  If certain conditions were met, Greece 
imposed no direct taxes on these offices or branches.131  This 
arrangement had been declared harmful by the Primarolo Group.132  The 
Commission found that this aid was specific as it was limited to certain 
companies conducting investment activities offshore and incompatible 
with the common market as it affected competition and trade between the 
Member States.133  Thus, the Commission required Greece to repeal this 
tax arrangement.134 
Concurrently, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) was working on its own report, entitled Harmful 
Tax Competition: An Emerging Global Issue, which set forth its criteria 
for evaluating preferential tax regimes and identifying tax havens.135  
These criteria focus on improving transparency and communication 
among nations and have led to the establishment of a Model Agreement 
on Exchange of Information in Tax Matters.136  In September 2006, the 
OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs released its latest progress report 
evaluating the preferential tax regimes in member countries.137 
Thus, both the European Union and the OECD believe it is important 
to distinguish between fair and harmful tax competition.  In general, fair 
tax competition is competition that has a downward effect by lowering 
tax rates and finding a balance between the tax burden and public 
services offered.  For example, a 2001 study concluded that tax 
competition between the Member States resulted in an across-the-board 
                                                          
 130. Id. at 946. 
 131. Id. (citing the Commission Decision of 11 July 2001—Proposal of Appropriate Measures 
under Article 88(1) of the EC Treaty on the Aid Scheme of Taxation of Foreign Commercial and 
Industrial Firms Covered by Act No. 89/67, notice published in 2002 O.J. (C 108) 2, 2 [hereinafter 
Commission Decision of 11 July 2001]. 
 132. Council of the European Union, Code of Conduct Group, Code of Conduct (Business 
Taxation), SN 4901/99, at 74 (Nov. 29, 1999). 
 133. Rossi-Maccanico, Review of State Aid, supra note 61, at 946 (citing the Commission 
Decision of 11 July 2001). 
 134. Id. 
 135. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Harmful Tax Competition: An 
Emerging Global Issue, at 19–35 (1998) [hereinafter OECD Report], see Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development, Harmful Tax Practices: About, http://www.oecd.org/about 
/0,2337,en_2649_33745_1_1_1_1_37427,00.html (last visited Aug. 25, 2008) (“[T]he OECD set out 
criteria for analyzing preferential regimes and identifying tax havens.”). 
 136. This is a non-binding agreement that sets forth two model agreements for increasing 
transparency among nations.  Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 
Agreement on Exchange of Information on Tax Matters, ¶ 4, http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd 
/15/43/2082215.pdf (last visited Aug. 25, 2008). 
 137. CENTRE FOR TAX POLICY AND ADMINISTRATION, THE OECD’S PROJECT ON HARMFUL 
TAX PRACTICES: 2006 UPDATE ON PROGRESS IN MEMBER COUNTRIES, http://www.oecd.org 
/dataoecd/1/17/37446434.pdf. 
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reduction in corporate tax rates coupled with an expansion in the tax base 
itself.138  The study also concluded that this trend increased transparency 
and minimized distortion among tax systems in a way that bolstered the 
positive effects of tax competition.139 
Harmful competition, by contrast, is not based on an evaluation of 
the most efficient relationship between taxation and benefits but focuses 
only on drawing investment and business to the regulating Member State 
and away from the other Member States.140  This kind of behavior is also 
known as a “race to the bottom” because these types of tax incentives 
promote inefficiency in domestic systems.141  Rather than focusing on 
finding the best balance of taxes and public services for taxpayers, 
Member States attempt to undercut each others’ tax regimes.142 
For example, tax measures that provide significantly lower levels of 
taxation, or zero taxation, in order to attract business to a Member State 
are considered potentially harmful.  In 2003, Jersey, Guernsey, and the 
Isle of Man—all U.K. offshore jurisdictions—came under heavy 
criticism for tax policies that placed a twenty percent tax rate on resident 
companies but no tax on nonresident companies.143  As a result of 
criticism from other Member States, the islands converted to a tax-free 
system for all companies operating within their territory, treating both 
resident and nonresident companies equally.144 
In categorizing competition between Member States, Pinto suggests 
evaluating both objective and subjective considerations: 
 
1. Is the tax incentive a general measure or a special targeted 
measure (e.g. limited to certain categories of income or certain 
business activities or certain taxpayers)? 
2. Does the Member State intend to spur its economic growth 
generally or attract investment at the expense of other Member 
States (demonstrated by a tax provision that lacks transparency 
and is applied on a discretionary basis)?145 
 
                                                          
 138. PINTO, supra note 51, at 40 (citing Sven-Olof Lodin, The Competitiveness of EU Tax 
Systems, 41 EUR. TAX’N 166 (May 2001)). 
 139. Id. 
 140. TAX COMPETITION IN EUROPE, supra note 85, at 7. 
 141. E.g., PINTO, supra note 51, at 11. 
 142. See id. at 11–12. 
 143. Barry Riley, Islands Gear Up For ‘Zero-Ten’ Challenge, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 30, 2006, at 4. 
 144. Id. 
 145. PINTO, supra note 51, at 10–12.  But see Hines, supra note 107. 
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Professor Avi-Yonah also concludes that “not all tax competition is 
equally harmful.” 146  In the context of global tax competition, he 
proposes a similar distinction between harmful and beneficial tax 
competition; that is, a distinction between limited tax reductions and 
generally applicable tax reductions.147 
B. United States 
The opinions with respect to the desirability or undesirability of state 
tax competition fluctuate between two extremes.  The discussion below 
summarizes the typical arguments that are made in favor of and in 
opposition to state tax competition. 
1. Arguments in Favor of State Tax Competition 
Proponents of tax competition argue that it reduces the inherently 
inefficient taxation of capital.148  Although admitting that a reduction of 
tax revenues results from such tax competition, Rogers stresses that this 
does not indicate “whether the loss of state tax revenues is good or bad 
for the economy at large.”149  He postulates that money in private hands 
increases investment and incomes150 because consumers and resource 
owners use the tax savings more efficiently than state governments.151 
Another proponent of tax competition, on the other hand, argues that 
discriminatory tax regimes are socially desirable because they protect tax 
revenues.152  Professor Keen’s argument is based on a model in which 
tax competition can be confined, within a country, to a mobile sector 
while maintaining or increasing high levels of taxation in an immobile 
sector.153  In doing so, a country can protect its ability to collect a great 
deal of tax revenue from an immobile base while at the same time  
 
 
                                                          
 146. Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Globalization, Tax Competition, and the Fiscal Crisis of the Welfare 
State, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1573, 1610 (2000). 
 147. Id. at 1627–29. 
 148. Rogers, supra note 34, at 110. 
 149. James R. Rogers, State Tax Competition and Congressional Commerce Power: The 
Original Prudence of Concurrent Taxing Authority, 7 REGENT U. L. REV. 103, 107 (1996). 
 150. Id. at 113. 
 151. Id. at 120. 
 152. Michael Keen, Preferential Regimes Can Make Tax Competition Less Harmful, 54 NAT’L 
TAX J. 757, 758 (2001). 
 153. Id. 
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competing with foreign countries, through preferential taxation, for the 
other’s mobile base and the marginal revenue increase it represents.154 
Tax competition is also said to promote efficient resource 
allocation.155  Gillette argues that incentives facilitate optimal matches 
between businesses and localities whenever a locality understands its 
needs better than a firm.156  In this case, bidding solves the problem of 
asymmetric distribution because the same firm assumes different values 
in different jurisdictions and that additional value is reflected in the 
bid.157  Rogers insists that tax competition will not result in the 
misallocation of resources because “state tax policies will not overcome 
comparative state cost advantages in equilibrium nor induce firms to 
locate in states with high relative production costs.”158 
The tax revenue reductions caused by tax competition forces 
government to be thrifty.159  McLure states that “[i]f competition is 
restrained, . . . it can generally be expected that economic welfare will 
suffer.”160  He suggests that “[i]n the absence of competition there is less 
incentive to be responsive to the desires of consumers and less pressure 
to minimize costs.”161  However, as incentive packages given by state 
and local governments continue to multiply in number, legal scholars 
have set forth numerous arguments with respect to the harmful effects of 
these incentives. 
2. Arguments Against State Tax Competition 
One counterargument asserts that state tax incentives do not 
accomplish what they are designed to do: influence the location decisions 
of businesses.  Tax incentives are marginal among the many factors 
businesses use to decide where to locate and are often only influential as 
a tie-breaker between comparatively similar business locations.162  
                                                          
 154. Id. 
 155. Rogers, supra note 149, at 108, 120. 
 156. Clayton P. Gillette, Business Incentives, Interstate Competition, and the Commerce Clause, 
82 MINN. L. REV. 447, 453–63 (1997–1998). 
 157. Id. at 457–58. 
 158. Rogers, supra note 149, at 115.  For further discussion of economic models demonstrating 
that bidding for firms enhances economic efficiency, see Dan A. Black & William H. Hoyt, Bidding 
for Firms, 79 AM. ECON. REV. 1249 (1989) and Ian R. King et al., Industrial Blackmail: Dynamic 
Tax Competition and Public Investment, 26 CAN. J. ECON. 590 (1993). 
 159. Rogers, supra note 34, at 109. 
 160. Charles E. McLure, Tax Competition: Is What’s Good for the Private Goose Also Good for 
the Public Gander?, 39 NAT’L TAX J. 341, 344 (1986). 
 161. Id. 
 162. The National Economic Policy Implications of State Tax Incentive Competition: Hearing on 
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Professor Enrich states that “tax incentives and other reductions in 
business tax burdens, even when they create significant differentials in 
tax levels, simply are not large enough to exert substantial influence on 
business location decisions or on levels of economic activity.”163  Fisher 
suggests that “only about 1 in 11 business investments can be attributed 
to . . . incentives.”164  “Because state [and] local taxes falling on 
businesses represent only about 1.2% of the total cost of doing business 
in the U.S.,” state tax incentives that reduce such costs generally do not 
provide much leverage over the location decision.165 
Hood describes incentive packages as “‘shakedowns’ by companies 
already planning to relocate in a state.”166  Because the business 
investment would have happened in the state anyway, state tax 
competition causes states to lose substantial tax revenue.  It also “distorts 
the distribution of tax burdens among different classes of taxpayers.”167  
Hood notes that “the majority of the creators of job and productivity 
gains throughout a state’s economy are hurt as their taxes go up to pay 
for infrastructure improvements, job-training subsidies, and other 
enticements.”168 
Tax incentive competition is at best a zero-sum game; it merely 
moves economic activity from one state to another with no net gain on 
either the national or local level.169  Any influx of jobs and investment 
“won” through incentive wars by one locality is offset by a 
                                                                                                                       
“Cuno and Competitiveness: Where to Draw the Line” Before the Subcomm. on Int’l Trade of the S. 
Comm. on Finance, 109th Cong. (2006) (statement of Peter Fisher) [hereinafter Statement of Fisher].  
See generally ROGER WILSON, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN THE STATES: STATE BUSINESS 
INCENTIVES AND ECONOMIC GROWTH: ARE THEY EFFECTIVE? A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 8–17 
(The Council of State Governments) (1989) (discussing the nature and process of plant location 
decisions). 
 163. Enrich, Saving the States, supra note 27, at 397. 
 164. Brief of Amicus Curiae Economics and Public Policy Professors et al. in Support of 
Respondents at 21, DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332 (2006) (Nos. 04-1704, 04-1724) 
(citing ALAN PETERS & PETER FISHER, STATE ENTERPRISE ZONE PROGRAMS: HAVE THEY 
WORKED? 113 (2002)) [hereinafter Cuno Amicus Curiae Brief]. 
 165. Id. at 17–18 (citing ROBERT G. LYNCH, RETHINKING GROWTH STRATEGIES: HOW STATE 
AND LOCAL TAXES AND SERVICES AFFECT ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 4 (2004)).  Moreover, 
targeted tax incentives are “offered to companies that would have undertaken the desired investment 
in the first place.”  David Brunori, Principles of Tax Policy and Targeted Tax Incentives, 97 ST. TAX 
TODAY 111 (1997). 
 166. John Hood, Ante Freeze: Stop the State Bidding Wars for Big Business, 68 POL’Y REV. 62, 
66 (1994). 
 167. Enrich, Saving the States, supra note 27, at 405.  One source notes that “these expenditures 
place small existing businesses at a disadvantage since they provide the large recruited companies 
with excess profits, gained from businesses subsidies, which could not be obtained without some risk 
in the marketplace.”  WILSON, supra note 162, at 5–6. 
 168. Hood, supra note 166, at 62. 
 169. Statement of Fisher, supra note 162. 
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corresponding loss to another.  Enrich notes that “competitive efforts of 
other states are likely to cancel out any positive effects that might be 
achieved by offering tax breaks.”170  Tax incentive competition quite 
possibly can be a negative-sum game that produces a net loss.171 
Although models designed to demonstrate the benefits of preferential 
tax regimes seem straightforward, as Keen admits, “[t]he assumptions 
being made on the tax bases are evidently extreme.”172  In fact, the 
assumptions are extreme enough so as to make the oversimplified 
model’s practical relevance and applicability tenuous at best.173  For 
example, such a model assumes that revenue maximization is a 
government’s sole goal,174 thereby failing to account for other 
governmental interests, such as employment and improved standard of 
living.175  Additionally, it cannot be assumed that immobile bases are 
perfectly inelastic; at some point the shifting tax burden will become too 
onerous causing the immobile base to become mobile.176  A model 
should not assume that high tax rates do not exacerbate diminishing 
marginal returns to labor.  By reducing the return an individual receives 
for his or her labor, the opportunity cost of engaging in income-
producing activities increases.177  This, in turn, would cause productivity 
to stagnate, if not decline, leading to a reduction in the tax revenue 
collected from the immobile base.  Absent the existence of circumstances 
in practice that mirror the model’s assumptions, the strong conclusion 
that discriminatory taxation is desirable and beneficial must be 
discounted and found to be unpersuasive in practice. 
Fisher suggests that tax incentives override market considerations in 
firm-location decisions, resulting in “a pattern of economic activity that 
requires greater use of real resources and hence reduces national 
economic efficiency.”178  Once a state lures a targeted business, it must 
pay for public service support for the business in the form of 
infrastructure and transportation costs, while leaving the previous state 
                                                          
 170. Enrich, Saving the States, supra note 27, at 397. 
 171. Cuno Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 164, at 10. 
 172. Keen, supra note 152, at 758–59. 
 173. See Joseph Bankman & David Weisbach, Reply: Consumption Taxation Is Still Superior to 
Income Taxation, 60 STAN. L. REV. 789, 790 (2007) (noting that the strong conclusions of simplified 
models are likely to be weakened by more complex models). 
 174. E.g., Keen, supra note 152, at 759. 
 175. E.g., supra text accompanying note 55. 
 176. See Keen, supra note 152, at 759–60 (noting that when the two bases are equally elastic, 
revenues are unaffected). 
 177. Bankman & Weisbach, supra note 173, at 792–93 (arguing that future consumption is a 
motivating benefit of working and higher income taxation reduces the benefit). 
 178. Statement of Fisher, supra note 162. 
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with redundant public service support infrastructure.  Enrich describes 
the states as follows: 
[They] find themselves caught in a classic prisoners’ dilemma.  If all 
the states would refrain from deploying location incentives for 
businesses, then they all could retain more robust tax bases to support 
other governmental functions.  But, if the other states are going to offer 
a widening array of tax breaks, then none can afford the costs—more 
political than economic—of abstaining.  As a result, incentives 
proliferate, leaving all the states worse off.179 
The state that wins the incentive wars also “loses” because as Enrich 
notes, “[b]usinesses have become increasingly adept at playing the states 
off against one another to stimulate more attractive offers.”180  Fisher 
asserts that the revenue lost through incentive packages makes it harder 
to finance the state’s education, police, fire, transportation, and utilities 
programs.181  By fostering a “race to the bottom” in which states must 
continually increase tax incentives in order to lure businesses, tax 
competition undermines the ability of state and local government to 
finance the investments in public education and infrastructure that 
provide the foundation for future economic growth.182  This tax 
competition and these bidding wars are “reducing the level of comity and 
cooperation among the states.”183 
There are a myriad of studies concerning the economic effects of 
state credits and incentives.184  Those measuring the influence of tax 
policies on local or state economic growth are probably the most 
common type of empirical research of potential relevance to state tax 
incentives.185  Bartik’s discussion of recent research on the effect of state 
and local taxes on economic development stated that “it seems quite 
likely that taxes do have statistically significant negative effects on the 
growth of a state or metropolitan area,” although “the exact magnitude of 
this negative effect is less clear.”186  Whether these tax effects are “large 
enough that a policy of reducing state and local business taxes, adopted 
                                                          
 179. Enrich, Saving the States, supra note 27, at 396. 
 180. Id. at 395. 
 181. Statement of Fisher, supra note 162. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Enrich, Saving the States, supra note 27, at 400–01. 
 184. See Kirk J. Stark & Daniel J. Wilson, What Do We Know About the Interstate Economic 
Effects of State Tax Incentives?, 4 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 133, 163 (2006) for an excellent 
introduction to the literature. 
 185. Id. at 157–58. 
 186. Timothy J. Bartik, The Effects of State and Local Taxes on Economic Development: A 
Review of Recent Research, 6 ECON. DEV. Q. 102, 105 (1992). 
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solely for the purpose of encouraging growth, would have net benefits,” 
is an entirely separate question.187 
Stark and Wilson state that while studies that examine the influence 
of tax policies on local or state economic growth are “no doubt valuable 
for state and local policymakers in setting economic development 
policies,” they “are of questionable relevance to the constitutionality of 
state business tax incentives under the dormant Commerce Clause.”188  
They explain: 
[I]t is not clear from these studies whether the observed effect is 
attributable to changes in the level of economic activity within a state 
(in-state effects) or a relocation of economic activity from one state to 
another (relocation effects).  Presumably only the latter would be 
objectionable on Commerce Clause grounds.  A state subsidy that has 
exclusively in-state effects cannot be said to encroach on Congress’s 
exclusive authority to regulate interstate commerce.  Second, because 
these studies focus on the effect of overall tax levels on economic 
activity, they do not adequately capture the discrete influence of 
specific tax incentives, such as the investment tax credit or the research 
and development tax credit.  From the standpoint of dormant 
Commerce Clause analysis, this is an important shortcoming of existing 
empirical research.189 
They then examine “more narrowly tailored econometric studies that 
have looked at the precise effect of specific tax incentives.”190  For 
example, one study conducted by Wilson focused upon “the effects of 
one state’s tax incentives on the R&D spending in other states.”191  
Wilson found that “the in-state and out-of-state effects of state R&D tax 
incentives roughly offset each other, leaving little overall impact on 
R&D spending for the nation as a whole.”192  Thus, it appears that “a 
state’s adoption of R&D tax credits has adverse practical effects on the 
level of R&D undertaken within other states.”193 
Jarrell adds that “[i]nterstate studies on the impact of [economic 
development incentives] on growth show marginally positive results, but 
the results are so inconsistent, even when using similar methods and 
                                                          
 187. Id. at 106. 
 188. Stark & Wilson, supra note 184, at 159. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. at 163 (citing Daniel J. Wilson, Beggar Thy Neighbor? The In-State vs. Out-of-State 
Impact of State R&D Tax Credits (Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, Working Paper No. 
2005–08), available at http://www.frbsf.org/publications/economics/papers/2005/wp05-08bk.pdf). 
 192. Id. 
 193. Id. 
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data, that the results are basically useless to policymakers.”194  A study 
conducted in Washington state in 1996 that focused on individual tax 
incentive plans “found little correlation between the amount of tax 
benefit received and growth in employment which resulted.”195  Jarrell 
opines that “[i]f a pattern emerges from these studies at all, it may be that 
the tax increases seem to have a statistically significant negative impact 
on economic growth of a region at the extremes—very high taxes or very 
low taxes.”196 
Although current econometric research does not provide a definitive 
conclusion concerning the practical economic effects of state tax 
incentives, I am persuaded to agree with the European Commission and 
the OECD that harmful tax competition exists.197  In Part III, I examine 
the current use of tax incentives in the United States and the European 
Union. 
III. USE OF TAX INCENTIVES 
A. United States 
There is no obligation on the individual states to impose taxes at a 
minimum rate; nor is there an obligation on the states to impose a certain 
type of tax such as sales, individual, or corporate taxes.198  Such 
sovereignty makes it possible for the individual states to engage in a 
substantial amount of tax competition as a means of attracting or 
retaining residents and businesses.199  “Our states are not united when it 
comes to taxation.  Each merrily goes its own way, angling for an 
economic advantage, their leaders hoping their actions will translate into 
votes on election day.”200  In fact, it has been reported that over the years, 
the states have become “more and more aggressive tax competitors.”201 
                                                          
 194. Sherry L. Jarrell et al., Law and Economics of Regulating Local Economic Development 
Incentives, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 805, 823 (2006). 
 195. Id. at 826 (citing Wash. State Dep’t of Revenue: Research Div., Economic Vitality, at 10 
(Mar. 2, 2002), available at http://dor.wa.gov/content/aboutus/statisticsandreports/wataxstudy 
/tax%20study%20economic%vitality.pdf). 
 196. Id. at 824. 
 197. At any rate, as my proposal only addresses tax incentives and not direct subsidies, the states 
can continue to compete on many other levels.  I am just removing one weapon from their arsenal, 
tax incentives.  They will agree not to use their state tax code in this endeavor. 
 198. Field, supra note 10, at 1213. 
 199. Id. 
 200. Martin A. Sullivan, Economic Analysis: Lessons from Europe on U.S. Corporate Taxes, 
111 TAX NOTES 420, 420 (2006). 
 201. Field, supra note 10, at 1214. 
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State tax credits and incentives are not a recent phenomenon in the 
United States.202  Since at least 1791, when New Jersey granted a tax 
exemption to Alexander Hamilton’s new manufacturing company, states 
have used tax incentives to lure businesses inside their borders.203  In 
recent years, however, states have demonstrated extraordinary creativity 
in developing tax policies designed to influence business decisions.204  
As of 2008, forty-eight states offered credits and incentives to persuade 
businesses to either locate, maintain, or expand their operations within 
the state.205  Although interstate competition to attract economic 
development has raised concerns regarding the smooth functioning of the 
national economy,206 the proliferation of tax credits and incentives has 
continued relatively unabated.207 
For example, in May 2007, ThyssenKrupp AG of Dusseldorf, 
Germany, chose Alabama for the site of a $3.7 billion steel mill ending a 
bidding war for the mill between Alabama and Louisiana.208  The $461 
million in direct subsidies granted included land acquisition, site 
preparation, worker training, and road improvements.209  An additional 
$350 million tax subsidy included relief from sales, property, and utility 
taxes by the state and local governments.210  The company also will not  
 
 
                                                          
 202. Enrich, Saving the States, supra note 27, at 382. 
 203. Mark L. Nachbar, Credits and Incentives: Alabama Through Hawaii, 1450-2nd TAX 
MGMT. (BNA) (2008) (citing Peter W. Bernstein, States Are Going Down Industrial Policy Lane, 
FORTUNE, Mar. 5, 1984, at 112). 
 204. Peter D. Enrich, The Rise—And Perhaps the Fall—of Business Tax Incentives, in THE 
FUTURE OF STATE TAXATION 73–74 (David Brunori ed., 1998). 
 205. Nachbar, supra note 203.  Wyoming, which has neither corporate income nor franchise 
taxes, does not offer business tax incentives.  Alaska offers credits, but for special industries only, 
like oil and gas exploration.  Mark L. Nachbar, Credits and Incentives, Nos. 1450-2nd, 1460-2nd, 
1470-2nd and 1480-1st, TAX MGMT. (BNA) (2008). 
 206. See, e.g., David Brunori, Introduction to THE FUTURE OF STATE TAXATION 6 (David 
Brunori ed., 1998) [hereinafter Brunori, State Taxation] (stating that “[c]ommentators generally 
agree that incentives violate the most basic principles of sound tax policy”); David Brunori, The 
Politics of State Taxation: Thou Shalt Not Use Tax Incentives, ST. TAX TODAY 557, 557 (Feb. 18, 
2002) [hereinafter Brunori, Thou Shalt Not Use Tax Incentives] (stating tax incentives violate “the 
cardinal rule that tax systems should be designed so that they have a minimal impact on economic 
activity”). 
 207. See Brunori, Thou Shalt Not Use Tax Incentives, supra note 206, at 557 (describing states, 
corporations, and consultants as actively in pursuit of granting and obtaining tax breaks); see also 
Brunori, State Taxation, supra note 206, at 6 (stating that tax incentives have increased “primarily 
because political leaders lack the will to reject them”). 
 208. Billy Hamilton, Saving the States from Themselves, 45 ST. TAX NOTES 131, DOC. NO. 2007-
15385 (2007) (LEXIS). 
 209. Id. 
 210. Id. 
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have to pay any state corporate income tax “for the next thirty years 
unless its tax liability exceeds $185 million in any year.”211 
This proliferation is occurring despite criticism regarding the 
effectiveness of state tax incentives coming from a myriad of economic 
studies.212  The National Association of State Development Agencies and 
the Council of State Governments have determined that only a few states 
have performed cost-benefit analyses of their Economic Development 
Incentive (EDI) programs.213  “While billions of dollars have been spent 
on EDI across the country in the last ten to fifteen years, states prefer not 
to evaluate tax incentive programs.”214  “[A]s long as EDI are legal, and 
as long as states and municipalities compete for a limited number of new 
and expanding businesses, it is in the local and state politicians’ interests 
to bid for the businesses if only to stay in the economic development 
game.”215  But while “[s]tate and local governments continue to 
demonstrate a seemingly limitless enthusiasm for economic development 
incentives . . . [e]conomists deride [such incentives] as fiscally 
irresponsible and irrational.”216  While it is difficult to determine the 
amount of corporate state and local economic development incentive 
spending with precise accuracy, Peters and Fisher estimate spending at 
$50 billion per year.217 
Although nearly all of the states use tax incentives to attract 
economic development, residents of the states granting such incentives 
have started challenging these programs.218  One of their claims is that 
                                                          
 211. Id. 
 212. See Stark & Wilson, supra note 184, at 157–63 (providing an analysis of several studies).  
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826 (citing Wash. State Dep’t of Revenue: Research Div., Economic Vitality, at 10 (Mar. 2, 2002), 
available at http://dor.wa.gov/content/aboutus/statisticsandreports/wataxstudy/tax%20study%20 
economic%vitality.pdf).  “One of the few analyses of a full-service program, the Industrial 
Development [Agency] (IDA), found that while $1.3 billion in taxes were foregone due to IDA 
bonds, the measured benefits were sparse.”  Id. at 826 (citing Robert G. Lynch et al., The 
Effectiveness of Firm-Specific State Tax Incentives in Promoting Economic Development: Evidence 
from New York State’s Industrial Development Agencies, 10 ECON. DEV. Q. 57 (1996)). 
 217. Alan Peters & Peter Fisher, The Failures of Economic Development Incentives, 70 J. AM. 
PLAN. ASS’N 27, 28 (2004). 
 218. See Jarrell et al., supra note 194, at 809 (“Lawsuits around the country have challenged the 
legality of EDI under state constitutions and other local laws.”). 
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the resulting tax revenue reductions shift the tax burden to them.219  The 
plaintiffs also attack the constitutionality of these state tax subsidies used 
to encourage investment within a state, using the dormant Commerce 
Clause.220  In Part IV, I analyze whether effective challenges to these 
targeted tax incentives can be brought in the United States given the 
current standing doctrine. 
B. European Union 
Although the Member States are required to impose a value added 
tax at a minimum rate as part of membership in the European Union,221 
the Member States retain their sovereignty in the direct tax area with the 
flexibility to select their own national tax rules with respect to tax base, 
rates, “and all other elements of their tax system.”222  Although the EC 
Treaty has been amended on multiple occasions to provide for the 
adoption of various harmonization measures by only a qualified majority 
vote of the Council, a unanimous vote is still required for EU tax 
legislation.223  Such fiscal sovereignty makes it possible for the Member 
                                                          
 219. See, e.g., Blinson v. State, 651 S.E. 2d 268, 273 (N.C. App. 2007) (“Plaintiffs contend that 
their status as taxpayers, suffering an increased tax burden as a result of the Dell incentives, is 
sufficient to provide plaintiffs with standing.”). 
 220. Id. (“[T]he disputed incentives and subsidies . . . discriminated against interstate commerce 
in violation of the [d]ormant Commerce Clause.”).  The dormant Commerce Clause is a doctrine that 
has been read into the Constitution’s affirmative grant of Congress’s power to regulate commerce.  
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.  See generally TRIBE, supra note 11, § 6-2 (discussing the dormant 
Commerce Clause). 
 221. TERRA & WATTEL, supra note 47, at 10–11.  The Community is financed in part by a 
percentage of the national bases of the value added tax, capped to a percentage of GNP.  Id. at 7. 
 222. PINTO, supra note 51, at 61; see LAURENCE W. GORMLEY, EU TAXATION LAW 2 (2005) 
(noting that the power retained by the Member States in the area of direct taxation must be exercised 
in a manner consistent with the terms of the EC Treaty).  Although the EC Treaty only identified the 
goal of harmonization with relation to indirect taxation, the Treaty also identified as a goal the 
removal of barriers to free movement of goods, persons, services and capital between Member 
States.  EC Treaty, supra note 43, arts. 23–60. 
 223. The Council shall, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after 
consulting the European Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee, issue 
directives for the approximation of such laws, regulations or administrative provisions 
of the Members States as directly affect the establishment or functioning of the 
common market. 
EC Treaty, supra note 43, art. 94.  Article 94 provides a legal basis for direct taxation harmonization 
measures.  SERVAAS VAN THIEL, FREE MOVEMENT OF PERSONS AND INCOME TAX LAW: THE 
EUROPEAN COURT IN SEARCH OF PRINCIPLES 112 (2002); cf. Albert J. Rädler, Tax Provisions of the 
Treaty of Rome—Lost in Transition, in IN MEMORIAM KARI S. TIKKA 1944–2006 422, 425 (Edward 
Andersson et al. eds., 2007) (discussing the possibility of changing a tax measure that is distorting 
competition through an Article 96 directive approved by a qualified majority of the Council if 
consultation by the Commission with the Member State is unproductive in eliminating the 
distortion). 
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States to engage in a significant amount of tax competition as a means of 
attracting or retaining residents and businesses subject to the limits of the 
EC Treaty, including the four fundamental freedoms and the state aid 
restrictions.224  These limitations are quite significant when compared to 
the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine of the United States. 
State aid generally occurs in one of two common forms: subsidies 
(grants transferred directly to the beneficiary) and tax measures 
(achieved through special allowances or deferrals, tax base reductions, or 
tax rate reductions).225  Thus, the concept of state aid goes beyond mere 
subsidy and includes any form of intervention that has a similar effect.226  
The main components of state aid are the following: 
 
1. there must be some advantage or benefit; 
2. it is granted by the Member State or through state resources; 
3. it gives an advantage to certain enterprises or the production of 
certain goods (the “selectivity” principle); 
4. it “distorts or threatens to distort competition”; and 
5. it is capable of affecting trade between Member States.227 
Clearly, the targeted tax incentives currently being used by the American 
States would constitute state aid. 
Certain state aid, however, is permissible.  Article 87(2) lists aid that 
is deemed compatible with the common market.228  Furthermore, the 
Commission may declare certain types of aid as compatible with the 
                                                          
 224. Christiana Hjl Panayi, State Aid and Tax: the Third Way?, 32 INTERTAX 283, 284 (2004); 
see Kaye, Discrimination, supra note 42, at 227–37 (discussing the applicability of the Four 
Freedoms). 
 225. See PINTO, supra note 51, at 100 (“The latter consist of a reduction of the tax burden 
achieved by way of special tax rules that deviate from a country’s general tax system.”).  For further 
information, see Commission Website on Listing of Decisions by Aid Instrument, 
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/state_aid/legislation/instruments.html (last visited Sept. 18, 
2008). 
 226. Panayi, supra note 224, at 285; see, e.g., Case C-200/97, Ecotrade Srl v. Altiforni e Ferriere 
di Servola SpA (AFS), 1998 E.C.R. 1-07907 ¶ 34; Case 30/59, De Gezamenlijke Steenkolenmijnen 
in Limburg v. High Authority, 1961 E.C.R. 1, 19. 
 227. EC Treaty, supra note 43, art. 87; Panayi, supra note 224, at 285. 
 228. Such as: 
(a) aid having a social character, granted to individual consumers, provided that such aid 
is granted without discrimination related to the origin of the products concerned; (b) aid 
to make good the damage caused by natural disasters or exceptional occurrences; (c) aid 
granted to the economy of certain areas of the Federal Republic of Germany affected by 
the division of Germany, in so far as such aid is required in order to compensate for the 
economic disadvantages caused by that division. 
EC Treaty, supra note 43, art. 87(2)(a)–(c). 
08.0_KAYE_FINAL 10/29/2008  11:11:42 AM 
124 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57 
common market if it falls into one of the five categories spelled out 
under the Treaty.229  The specific procedures governing the granting of 
state aid in the European Union were set forth in a Council Regulation.230  
In relevant part, Article 89 authorizes the Council to “make any 
appropriate regulations for the application of Articles 87 and 88.”231  The 
Council Regulation setting forth the following procedures was passed as 
an integral step toward the development of a permanent state aid policy 
for the European Union.232 
Article 1 of the Council Regulation treats state aid as either existing 
aid, new aid, or unlawful aid, regardless of the form taken by the aid in 
question.233  The following sections describe the categories of actions 
that qualify as state aid. 
1. Existing Aid 
Existing aid includes aid that was in operation in a Member State 
prior to the creation of the EC Treaty, authorized aid, aid that was 
previously approved by the Commission or Council, and aid that is 
authorized by default.234  The Council Regulation lists two additional 
categories of existing aid: “aid which is deemed to be existing aid 
pursuant to Article 15,”235 and aid that at the time it was put into effect  
 
                                                          
 229. The five categories are as follows: 
(a) aid to promote the economic development of areas where the standard of living is 
abnormally low or where there is serious underemployment; (b) aid to promote the 
execution of an important project of common European interest or to remedy a serious 
disturbance in the economy of a Member State; (c) aid to facilitate the development of 
certain economic activities or of certain economic areas . . . ; (d) aid to promote culture 
and heritage conservation where such aid does not affect trading conditions and 
competition in the Community . . . ; (e) such other categories of aid as may be specified 
by decision of the Council acting by a qualified majority on a proposal from the 
Commission. 
Id. art. 87(3)(a)–(e); see BERMANN ET AL., supra note 54, at 1014–15. 
 230. Council Regulation 659/99, 1999 O.J. (L 83) (EC) [hereinafter Procedural Council 
Regulation].  The Council’s authority to regulate state aid derives from Article 89 of the EC Treaty.  
EC Treaty, supra note 43, art. 88(2). 
 231. EC Treaty, supra note 43, art. 89. 
 232. Procedural Council Regulation, supra note 230, at 1. 
 233. Id. art. 1(a)–(c), (f). 
 234. Id. art. 1(b)(i)–(iv).  Aid by default occurs when the Commission has not made a timely 
decision on the compatibility of aid required by the procedure in Article 88.  See RAYMOND H.C. 
LUJA, ASSESSMENT AND RECOVERY OF TAX INCENTIVES IN THE EC AND THE WTO: A VIEW ON 
STATE AIDS, TRADE  SUBSIDIES AND DIRECT TAXATION 87 (2003) (discussing the procedural 
regulations of existing aid). 
 235. Procedural Council Regulation, supra note 230, art. 1(b)(iv). 
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did not constitute an aid but due to changes in the common market is 
now considered an aid.236 
2. New Aid 
The term new aid includes aid that is not existing aid or existing aid 
that has been substantially modified.237  Any Member State that plans to 
grant new aid must notify the Commission in “sufficient time” in order to 
enable the Commission to examine the aid in question and make a 
decision on the lawfulness of the proposed aid.238  Even aid that is 
exempt from the general ban on state aid is required to conform to the 
notification law.239 
3. Unlawful Aid 
The Council Regulation broadly defines unlawful aid as all aid that, 
when put into effect, violates Article 88(3) of the EC Treaty.240  Thus, 
unlawful aid usually results from a procedural violation.241  This is a 
different standard than “incompatible” aid, which can become lawful if it 
is altered as prescribed by the Commission.242  Unlawful aid may also 
include aid that was issued in violation of the notification 
requirements.243 
4. Exemptions from State Aid Restrictions 
The Commission has the authority to create block exemptions for 
certain categories of aid that it feels should be compatible with the 
common market and thus exempt from the notification requirements of 
                                                          
 236. Id. art. 1(b)(v). 
 237. Id. art. 1(c). 
 238. Id. art. 2 (sharing the steps for complete notification).  Two months plus a fifteen day grace 
period is considered sufficient time by the Commission.  Id. art. 4; see Paul F. Nemitz, 22. FIDE 
Congress, 1–4 November 2006, Cyprus, in 29 THE EFFECTIVE APPLICATION OF EU STATE AID 
PROCEDURES: THE ROLE OF NATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE, 8 (2007) (positing that the procedure 
was established to address the common concern that “one firm’s subsidy may be the unemployment 
of another’s workforce”). 
 239. Commission Communication, 1983 O.J. (C 318) 3 (EC). 
 240. Procedural Council Regulation, supra note 230, art. 1(f). 
 241. Ileana Simplicean-Stroia, Study of the State Aid Policy in the European Community: The 
“Illegal” State Aid Problem, 3 J. INT’L LEGAL STUD. 87, 101–02 (1997). 
 242. Id. at 102–03. 
 243. Id. at 103.  See Nemitz, supra note 238, at 10 (noting that between 2000 and 2005, “717 
non-notified aid cases have been registered”). 
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the EC Treaty.244  Such exemptions are created by the Commission 
through the adoption of regulations and include the de minimis 
exemption245 and the regional aid exemption.246  Categorization as an 
exempt type of aid does not remove the aid from the scrutiny of the 
Commission, however, and Member States with such aid programs are 
required to maintain transparency in accordance with rules set forth by 
the Commission.247 
a. De Minimis Exemption 
If the aid granted by a state does not exceed a certain fixed amount 
or continue beyond a certain fixed period of time, then the aid is 
considered de minimis and is exempt from state aid notification 
requirements in Article 88.248  Specifically, if the total aid granted to any 
one enterprise does not exceed EUR 200,000 over the course of three 
years, then the aid is considered de minimis.249 
b. Regional Aid Exemption 
Aid that is granted to promote economic development in 
disadvantaged regions of the European Union qualifies as a categorical 
exemption known as national regional aid.250  According to Commission 
guidelines, national regional aid encompasses both aid for investment 
given to large companies251 and, on occasion, operating aid for those 
companies.252  To qualify as national regional aid, the aid must “redress 
                                                          
 244. Council Regulation 994/98, 1998 O.J. (L 142) 1, art. 1 (EC) [hereinafter Exemption 
Council Regulation]. 
 245. Id. art. 1–2. 
 246. Id. art. 1(1)(b). 
 247. Id. art. 3(1).  See id. art. 3(2)–(4) for required rules.  See also Commission Regulation 
1998/2006, On the Application of Articles 87 and 88 of the treaty to de minimis Aid, 2006 O.J. (L 
379) 8 (EC) [hereinafter De minimis Commission Regulation].  Transparency requirements under 
the regional aid exemption state that all regional aid schemes within the EU be published and 
available on the internet.  European Commission, Guidelines on National Regional Aid for 2007–
2013, 2006 O.J. (C 54) 32 [hereinafter Commission Guidelines]. 
 248. Exemption Council Regulation, supra note 244, art. 2(1). 
 249. De minimis Commission Regulation, supra note 247, art. 2(2); see European Commission, 
State Aid Scoreboard, at 30, COM (2007) 347 final (June 28, 2007). 
 250. Commission Guidelines, supra note 247, at 1; Exemption Council Regulation, supra note 
244, art. 1(1)(b). 
 251. Aid for initial investment is compatible with the common market if it is granted in approved 
regions and does not exceed the appropriate ceiling.  Commission Regulation (EC) 1628/2006, art. 4, 
2006 O.J. (L 302) 34. 
 252. Commission Guidelines, supra note 247, at 13. 
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regional disparities” and assist development in disadvantaged areas.253  
Furthermore, investment aid to small and medium-sized companies 
located in disadvantaged regions also constitutes national regional aid.254  
In order to ensure consistency in applying this exemption, the 
Commission must approve regional aid maps presented by Member 
States that delineate the areas where the Member State believes regional 
aid is appropriate.255  This condition is now a prerequisite for Member 
States to be granted regional aid exemptions.256 
Since 2002, total state aid granted by the Member States has been 
declining—from 56.7 billion euros in 2002 to 47.9 billion euros in 
2006.257  This is consistent with the Commission’s State Aid Action Plan 
that emphasizes the principle of “less and better targeted state aid.”258  
The central objective of this plan is to encourage Member States to 
reduce their overall levels of state aid and focus the aid that is granted on 
projects that fulfill Community objectives.259  In 2006, the Competition 
Commissioner called the Plan’s implementation her first priority.260  The 
Commissioner has demonstrated flexibility and practicality by 
implementing rules and regulations that simplify the Plan’s framework in 
order to increase efficiency and compliance while maintaining its 
viability.261 
                                                          
 253. Id. at 13. 
 254. Id.  The Commission devoted a great deal of time to the discussion of the parameters of 
national regional aid in its Commission Guidelines.  See generally id. 
 255. See EC Treaty, supra note 43, art. 87(3).  The Commission has approved the regional aid 
maps of twenty-five Member States for the period 2007 through 2013.  State Aid Scoreboard, supra 
note 249, at 32. 
 256. Press Release, European Commission, State Aid: Commission Approves Regional Aid Map 
2007–2013 for Portugal (Feb. 7, 2007) [hereinafter Portugal Approves Regional Map].  The 
Commission approved Portugal’s regional aid map.  Id.; Press Release, European Commission, State 
Aid: Commission Guidelines on National Regional Aid for 2007–2013 in Portugal—Frequently 
Asked Questions (Feb. 7, 2007).  Although 70.1% of Portugal’s population remains eligible for 
regional aid, the regions are eligible for varying levels of aid and for varying durations.  Portugal 
Approves Regional Map, supra. 
 257. See Table: Total State Aid by Member State, in Million Euro, http://ec.europa.eu 
/comm/competition/state_aid/studies_reports/stat_tables.html (last visited July 9, 2008).  These 
calculations represent total aid less aid to the agriculture, fisheries, and transport sectors. 
 258. European Commission, State Aid Action Plan: Less and Better Targeted State Aid: A 
Roadmap for State Aid Reform 2005–2009, at COM (2005) 107 final (July 6, 2005), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/state_aid/others/action_plan/saap_en.pdf. 
 259. E.g., id. at 5. 
 260. Neelie Kroes, Comm’r, Competition Comm’n, Remarks at Conference Concurrence 2006 
in Paris: Competition Policy—2005 Review, 2006 Outlook, (June 23, 2006), available at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/06/406&format=HTML&aged=
1&language=EN&guiLanguage=en. 
 261. See generally Neelie Kroes, Comm’r, Competition Comm’n, Introductory Remarks at Press 
Conference for General Block Exemption Regulation for State Aid, Brussels (July 7, 2008), 
available  at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/08/378&format= 
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IV. PROCEDURES FOR CHALLENGING TAX INCENTIVES 
A. United States 
In 2004, in Cuno v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., the Sixth Circuit Court 
of Appeals invalidated Ohio’s investment tax credit (ITC) that was 
applied against the state franchise tax, finding it discriminatory against 
interstate commerce.262  The U.S. Supreme Court heard the case and 
vacated, on the basis of a procedural issue regarding the Sixth Circuit’s 
opinion in May 2006.263  The Court did not discuss the merits of the case 
because it decided that the taxpayers lacked standing to pursue their 
complaint.264  Therefore, questions regarding the constitutionality of state 
ITCs and other corporate tax incentives remain unanswered. 
City and state taxpayers in Cuno originally filed suit in state court, 
challenging the local property tax abatements and state franchise tax 
credits that had been granted to an automobile manufacturer.265  
Defendants, however, removed the action to U.S. District Court.266  
Plaintiffs filed motion to remand, questioning their own “ability to 
satisfy either the constitutional or prudential limitations on standing in 
the federal court.”267  Upon plaintiffs’ motion for remand, defendants 
argued that plaintiffs’ Commerce Clause claims fell within the court’s 
federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and that the related 
state claims were within the court’s supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to 
28 U.S.C. § 1367.268 
                                                                                                                       
HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en; Press Release, Competition Comm’n, State Aid: 
Competition Commissioner Kroes Meets Polish Treasury Minister Grad to Discuss Polish Shipyards, 
Brussels (July 9, 2008), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference= 
MEMO/08/495&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en. 
 262. 386 F.3d 738, 746 (6th Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 545 U.S. 1165 (2005), vacated in part and 
remanded, 547 U.S. 332 (2006).  In Cuno, the Sixth Circuit ruled on two Ohio tax incentives granted 
to DaimlerChrysler to build a plant in Toledo.  Id. at 746.  The court held that the property tax 
exemptions did not violate the dormant Commerce Clause because it did not favor in-state activity.  
Id. at 747.  However, the Supreme Court in Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 
found that a property tax exemption that did not apply to nonprofit organizations run for the benefit 
of nonresidents violated the dormant Commerce Clause.  520 U.S. 564 (1997).  The Sixth Circuit 
distinguished the Ohio property tax scheme by noting that it did not discriminate against 
nonresidents.  Cuno, 386 F.3d at 747. 
 263. DaimlerChrysler  Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 338 (2006). 
 264. Id. (“We are obligated before reaching this Commerce Clause question to determine 
whether the taxpayers who objected to the credit have standing to press their complaint in federal 
court.  We conclude that they do not, and we therefore can proceed no further.”). 
 265. Id. at 338–39. 
 266. Id. at 339.  The removal occurred pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(1). 
 267. Cuno, 547 U.S. at 339 (citing Plaintiff’s Supplemental Motion for Remand to State Court at 
13, Cuno v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 154 F. Supp. 2d 1196 (N.D. Ohio 2001) (No. 3:00cv 7247)). 
 268. Defendants’ Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Remand at 2, Cuno, 154 
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The District Court did not remand, finding instead that the taxpayers 
had standing “under the ‘municipal taxpayer standing’ rule articulated in 
Massachusetts v. Mellon.”269  The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit 
addressed the merits of the taxpayers’ case (ignoring the issue of 
standing) and held that the property tax exemption was constitutional but 
that the state ITC violated the Commerce Clause.270  Both plaintiffs and 
defendants sought certiorari to review the Court of Appeals’ decision.271  
In granting certiorari only with respect to the ITC issue, the Supreme 
Court asked that the parties address whether plaintiffs had standing to 
challenge the state’s ITC.272 
The Supreme Court described the requirements to obtain standing 
under Article III of the U.S. Constitution at the forefront of its opinion in 
Cuno.273  First, the Court recognized the significance of the case-or-
controversy limitation.274  Citing Raines v. Byrd, the Court reiterated that 
“no principle is more fundamental to the judiciary’s proper role in our 
system of government than the constitutional limitation of federal-court 
jurisdiction to actual cases or controversies.”275  The Raines Court stated 
that for purposes of establishing standing, the litigant “must allege 
personal injury fairly traceable to the defendant’s allegedly unlawful 
conduct and likely to be redressed by the requested relief.”276 
In determining whether the taxpayers in Cuno were personally 
injured, the Court cited Massachusetts v. Mellon, where the Court 
previously rejected a claim “that improper federal appropriations would 
‘increase the burden of future taxation and thereby take [the plaintiff’s] 
property without due process of law.’”277  The Mellon Court explained 
                                                                                                                       
F. Supp. 2d 1196 (No. 3:00cv 7247). 
 269. Cuno, 547 U.S. at 339–40 (citing Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923) (decided 
with Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923)).  “The interest of a taxpayer of a municipality in 
the application of its moneys is direct and immediate and the remedy by injunction to prevent their 
misuse is not inappropriate.”  Mellon, 262 U.S. at 486. 
 270. Cuno, 547 U.S. at 340. 
 271. Id. 
 272. Id. 
 273. Id. at 341–47.  The Constitution states: 
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this 
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, 
under their Authority . . . to Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party; to 
Controversies between two or more States; between a State and Citizens of another State; 
between Citizens of different States . . . . 
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
 274. Cuno, 547 U.S. at 341. 
 275. Id. at 341–42 (citing Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 818 (1997)). 
 276. Raines, 521 U.S. at 818–19 (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984)). 
 277. Cuno, 547 U.S. at 343 (quoting Mellon, 262 U.S. at 486). 
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that “interest in the moneys of the Treasury . . . is shared with millions of 
others . . . and the effect upon future taxation, of any payment out of the 
funds, so remote, fluctuating and uncertain, that no basis is afforded for 
an appeal to the preventive powers of a court of equity.”278  Thus, where 
the injury is common to all taxpayers, plaintiff has no standing to 
challenge the tax in a federal court because the alleged injury is not 
“concrete and particularized.”279 
The Lujan Court set forth the following three elements that a plaintiff 
must satisfy before gaining access to the federal judiciary: (1) the 
plaintiff must have suffered a concrete and particularized injury in fact, 
not an injury that is conjectural or hypothetical; (2) there must be a 
causal connection between the plaintiff’s injury and the alleged illegal 
conduct; and (3) a favorable court decision must be likely to redress the 
plaintiff’s alleged injury.280 
Finally, the Court cited Doremus v. Board of Education of 
Hawthorne for the proposition that the “rationale for rejecting federal 
taxpayer standing applies with undiminished force to state taxpayers.”281  
The Court in Doremus explicitly stated that a taxpayer’s claim can meet 
the case-or-controversy test “only when it is a good-faith pocketbook 
action.”282  The Court recognized that “the interests of a taxpayer in the 
moneys of the federal treasury are too indeterminable, remote, uncertain 
and indirect to furnish a basis for an appeal to the preventive powers of 
the Court over their manner of expenditure.”283  The Court thought this 
proposition “equally true when a state Act is assailed.”284 
Based on the reasoning of the aforementioned cases, the Cuno Court 
ultimately concluded that the “state taxpayers have no standing under 
Article III to challenge state tax or spending decisions simply by virtue 
of their status as taxpayers.”285  In reaching its holding, the Court also 
reasoned that Flast v. Cohen286 was inapplicable because “[w]hatever 
rights plaintiffs have under the Commerce Clause, they are 
                                                          
 278. Mellon, 262 U.S. at 487. 
 279. Cuno, 547 U.S. at 344 (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)). 
 280. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61. 
 281. Cuno, 547 U.S. at 345 (citing Doremus v. Bd. of Educ. of Hawthorne, 342 U.S. 429 
(1952)). 
 282. Doremus, 342 U.S. at 434. 
 283. Id. at 433–34 (citing Alabama Power Co. v. Ickes, 302 U.S. 464, 478–79 (1938); Mellon, 
262 U.S. at 447, 486). 
 284. Id. at 434. 
 285. Cuno, 547 U.S. at 346. 
 286. 392 U.S. 83 (1968). 
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fundamentally unlike” those rights under the Establishment Clause.287  In 
Flast, the Court held that “because ‘the Establishment Clause . . . 
specifically limits the taxing and spending power conferred by Art. I, § 
8,’ ‘a taxpayer will have standing consistent with Article III to invoke 
federal judicial power when he alleges that congressional action under 
the taxing and spending clause is in derogation of’ the Establishment 
Clause.”288  But the Supreme Court denied that this Commerce Clause 
challenge was analogous to the Establishment Clause challenge in 
Flast.289  Thus, the Supreme Court vacated in part the judgment of the 
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, and remanded for dismissal the 
plaintiffs’ challenge to the Ohio ITC.290 
Pursuant to the Court’s decision in Cuno, it now appears that a 
federal court is not the appropriate forum for a state taxpayer to 
challenge a state tax incentive.291  The Cuno decision clarifies that being 
a state taxpayer is not sufficient for standing under Article III of the 
United States Constitution to challenge a state tax incentive program as a 
Commerce Clause violation.292  Given Cuno and the cases that the Court 
cites within its opinion, a state taxpayer must establish that he has 
sustained a direct injury as a result of the challenged tax scheme before 
such a taxpayer may bring suit in federal court.  The injury cannot be one 
that is common with people generally, nor can it be an injury that is 
hypothetical.  However, the requirements to sue in state court may not be 
quite as stringent.293 
Competitors of the tax incentive recipient may be better positioned to 
raise a federal court claim.294  Professor Enrich argues that the states 
themselves are in the best position to bring a challenge to state tax 
                                                          
 287. Cuno, 547 U.S. at 347. 
 288. Id. (quoting Flast, 392 U.S. at 105–06). 
 289. See id. at 349 (“Plaintiffs thus do not have state taxpayer standing on the ground that their 
Commerce Clause challenge is just like the Establishment Clause challenge in Flast.”). 
 290. Id. at 354. 
 291. Previously, some commentators had concluded that “judges are often quite friendly to 
state . . . taxpayers in federal court.”  Nancy C. Staudt, Taxpayers in Court: A Systematic Study of a 
(Misunderstood) Standing Doctrine, 52 EMORY L.J. 771, 846–47 (2003).  Note that this article pre-
dates the Cuno holding. 
 292. Plaintiffs in Cuno argued that they had standing as state taxpayers pursuant to the Court’s 
holding in Flast, 392 U.S. 83, 105–06 (1968).  Cuno, 547 U.S. at 347.  Plaintiffs argued that there 
was a “sufficiently close nexus between the plaintiffs’ taxpayer status and the claims that they 
assert.”  Respondents’ Brief at 11, Cuno, 547 U.S. 332 (Nos. 04-1704 & 04-1724).  Plaintiffs also 
argued that they had standing as municipal taxpayers.  Id. at 15. 
 293. See infra text accompanying notes 300–307. 
 294. Kristin E. Hickman, How Did We Get Here Anyway?: Considering the Standing Question 
in DaimlerChrysler v. Cuno, 4 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 47, 63 (2006).  Examples of successful 
challengers are Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 267 (1984), and Boston Stock Exchange 
v. State Tax Commission, 429 U.S. 318, 329 (1977).  Hickman, supra, at 63 n.93. 
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incentives because they are the “most direct losers in the ongoing 
incentive competition.” 295  What may at first appear as healthy inter-state 
competition can ultimately lead to a “race to the bottom.”296  Secondly, 
Enrich points out that “states are particularly appropriate parties to bring 
Commerce Clause issues before the courts” because the Commerce 
Clause’s “primary focus concerns the structural dangers posed to the 
federal system by excessive state interference with the dynamics of the 
national economy.”297  “[T]he states have a peculiarly direct and 
compelling interest in the enforcement of this structural safeguard of 
federalism.”298  However, it appears that the states have no interest in 
challenging tax incentives as more than half the states and several U.S. 
Territories filed an amicus brief together in support of petitioners’ 
argument that Ohio’s ITC did not violate the dormant Commerce 
Clause.299 
State court is the alternative venue to pursue these challenges.  In 
ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, the Court distinguished between a state 
taxpayer’s standing in state court and federal court.300  The Court 
addressed a state taxpayer’s standing in federal court, stating that the 
Court has already “likened state taxpayers to federal taxpayers,” and has 
thus, “refused to confer standing upon a state taxpayer absent a showing 
of ‘direct injury,’ pecuniary or otherwise.”301  But the Court 
differentiated a state taxpayer’s standing in state court: 
[T]he constraints of Article III do not apply to state courts, and 
accordingly the state courts are not bound by the limitations of a case or 
controversy or other federal rules of justiciability even when they  
 
 
                                                          
 295. Enrich, Saving the States, supra note 27, at 418–19 (stating that the incentive system leaves 
the states “with diminished and distorted revenue capacities and without appreciable compensating 
economic gains” ). 
 296. Id. at 380. 
 297. Id. at 419. 
 298. Id.  Enrich also asserts that the states are the “most attractive and plausible candidates to 
bring challenges to other states’ location incentives” because “some state officials might find the 
idea of a legal challenge to a competitor state’s incentive policies highly attractive.”  Id. at 418–19. 
 299. Brief of Florida et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Wilkins v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 
332 (2006) (No. 04-1724) (decided together with DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno (No. 04-1704)).  
The complete list of signatories to this amicus brief is as follows: Florida, Alabama, Arizona, 
Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Guam, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, 
Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, 
New York, North Dakota, Northern Mariana Islands, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Puerto Rico, 
South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Washington, and Wisconsin.  Id. 
 300. 490 U.S. 605, 613–24 (1989). 
 301. Id. at 613–14 (citing Doremus v. Bd. of Educ., 342 U.S. 429, 434 (1952)). 
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address issues of federal law, as when they are called upon to interpret 
the Constitution . . . .302 
Given the Kadish decision, it is clear that states are not bound to adhere 
to the “case-or-controversy” doctrine.  Thus, it appears that state court, as 
opposed to federal court, will more likely address the merits of a state 
taxpayer’s challenge to a state tax incentive.303 
Of course, the standing rules vary from state to state.304  For 
example, it appears that the rules for taxpayer standing in Ohio state 
courts are relatively “lax.”305  The Ohio Court of Appeals held that “a 
taxpayer challenging the state’s biodiesel purchase has standing to 
prevent the state from entering into an illegal contract.”306  The court 
stated that “when an expenditure from the state’s general revenue fund is 
questioned, a party’s status as a taxpayer, independent of any other 
particular concern with the expenditure involved, will meet the ‘special 
interest’ requirement of Masterson.”307 
It appears that “the inability of [the Cuno] plaintiffs to challenge 
investment tax credits in federal court does not close the book on the 
constitutionality of investment tax credits.  Rather, it requires 
plaintiffs . . . to proceed through their state court system (which may 
                                                          
 302. Id. at 617.  The Kadish Court stated that while state taxpayers “would not have had standing 
to commence suit in federal court based on the allegations in the complaint, they are not the party 
attempting to invoke the federal judicial power.”  Id. at 618.  Thus, the Court held that the petitioners 
(defendants in state court) had standing “to invoke the authority of a federal court.”  Id. 
 303. As evidenced by the Kadish case, this does not mean that such complaint will never reach 
the U.S. Supreme Court.  Kadish suggests that a taxpayer challenge, where a decision is reached on 
the merits of a significant federal issue in a state’s highest court, could be appealed to the U.S. 
Supreme Court by the non-taxpayer party.  28 U.S.C. § 1257(a) provides for federal question appeals 
from “the highest court of a state in which a decision could be had” to the U.S. Supreme Court.  The 
non-taxpayer party could establish Article III standing for such an appeal by virtue of the “direct, 
specific, and concrete injury” suffered as a result of a loss in state court.  Kadish, 490 U.S. 623–24.  
Kadish does not provide Article III standing for the taxpayer plaintiffs who originally brought the 
suit, however, even if they lose in state court.  Id. at 624.  Therefore, Cuno and other taxpayer 
plaintiffs who never had Article III standing will have no further recourse if they lose ultimately in 
the state court system. 
 304. See Helen Hershkoff, State Courts and the “Passive Virtues”: Rethinking the Judicial 
Function, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1833 (2001) (“[J]udicial practice in some states differs—and differs 
radically—from the federal model . . . .  Many state courts do conform . . . to the Article III model.”). 
 305. Jennifer Carr & Cara Griffith, Establishing Standing in the Ohio Incentives Case: An 
Insurmountable Task?, 39 ST. TAX NOTES 651, Doc. No. 2006-3301 (LEXIS) (2006). 
 306. Id. (citing Griffin Indus. Inc. v. Dep’t of Admin. Servs., No. 00AP-1139, (Ohio Ct. App. 
Aug. 2, 2001)). 
 307. Id. (citation omitted).  The Court was referencing Masterson v. Ohio State Racing 
Commission, 162 Ohio St. 366, 368 (Ohio 1954), where the Supreme Court of Ohio held that 
“private citizens may not restrain official acts when they fail to allege and prove damage to 
themselves different in character from that sustained by the public generally.”  Id. 
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have more lenient requirements for standing).”308  Immediately after the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Cuno, Professor Enrich promised “to refile 
the case in state court.”309  However, Ohio revised its tax structure in 
2005 by phasing out the franchise tax and eliminating the ITC.310  
Therefore, Enrich has abandoned plans to pursue the Cuno case in state 
court. 
More litigation over state tax laws that provide tax advantages to in-
state business activity is underway in many states.  In North Carolina, 
several groups of taxpayers represented by the North Carolina Institute 
for Constitutional Law (NCICL) have challenged incentives offered to 
companies investing in the state.  One case involved a plan by North 
Carolina state and local governments to provide the computer company, 
Dell Inc., with $279 million in various tax incentives and subsidies to 
build a computer manufacturing and distribution facility in the state.311  
Taxpayers relied on the Commerce Clause and various state 
constitutional arguments to challenge the tax incentive package.312  The 
North Carolina Superior Court dismissed the complaint due to lack of 
standing.313  The Court of Appeals of North Carolina affirmed the trial 
court’s conclusion that the taxpayers lacked standing.314 
                                                          
 308. Kathryn Lee Dietrich, Saving the States from Unsuitable Plaintiffs: Uncovering the Lack of 
Standing in Challengers to State Income Tax Credits for Business Development, 36 CUMB. L. REV. 
343, 345 (2005–06).  Defendants in state cases attempting removal to take advantage of the Cuno 
precedent will likely fail.  Courts after Cuno should refuse removal for cases involving taxpayer 
plaintiffs because the parties have no Article III standing and could not have brought these cases in 
federal court originally.  Because defendants can only remove cases that could have been filed by 
plaintiffs in federal court from the beginning, Cuno should be a barrier to removal.  E.g., JACK H. 
FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 2.11 at 59 (4th ed. 2005).  Moreover, even if a state 
challenge is removed to federal court, it should be remanded to state court.  Some commentators 
assert that if a federal court is at all uncertain of its power to hear a case, it must remand.  Id. at 67. 
 When the plaintiffs in Cuno requested remand to state court, the trial court refused, stating that the 
“municipal taxpayer rule” from the Mellon case established standing for the plaintiffs.  Cuno, 547 
U.S. at 339–40.  Now that the Cuno case has established that no such standing exists for taxpayers 
challenging state tax incentives, district courts in the future will be more likely to remand such cases 
as improper removals. 
 309. John C. Biggins, Incentives After Cuno—Uncertainties Continue for States and Businesses, 
J. MULTISTATE TAX’N & INCENTIVES, Nov. 16, 2006, at 8, 11. 
 310. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 5733.01(G), 5733.33(B)(1) (West 2008). 
 311. Complaint at 1–2, Blinson v. North Carolina, 651 S.E.2d 268 (N.C. Ct. App. 2007) (No. 05-
CVS-8378) (alleging the existence of a $242 million incentive package from the state, and a $37 
million package offered by the City of Winston-Salem and Forsyth County governments), available 
at http://www.ncicl.org/assets/uploads/brief/2005.06.23-dell-complaint-w-exhibits.pdf. 
 312. Kay Miller Hobart, Judge Dismisses Lawsuit Over Dell Incentives Package, 40 ST. TAX 
NOTES 669, Doc. No. 2006-9917 (2006) (LEXIS). 
 313. Blinson, 651 S.E.2d at 273.  The judge was “not content to base his decision on standing 
alone,” and “went on to dismiss the Commerce Clause claims as lacking substantive merit.”  Hobart, 
supra note 312. 
 314. Blinson, 651 S.E.2d at 274, review denied, 661 S.E.2d 240 (N.C. 2008). 
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Another group of taxpayers, also represented by the NCICL, is 
challenging an economic development incentive granted to a wholly 
owned subsidiary of Google, Inc.315  The package, worth approximately 
$165 million, includes complete relief of “business personal property 
taxes and an 80% refund of real property taxes for the next 30 years.”316  
This case, filed in Wake County Superior Court, alleges violations of 
numerous provisions of the North Carolina Constitution.317 
In December 2007, the NCICL initiated two additional lawsuits on 
behalf of concerned taxpayers.318  The first case was filed in Wake 
County Superior Court in response to the $60 million incentive package 
given to Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company and Bridgestone Americas 
Holding, Inc.319  The second case, filed in Durham County Superior 
Court, challenges a Durham County plan to give $100,000 in subsidies to 
the Nitronex Corporation in exchange for moving its business from 
another county in North Carolina.320  Neither of the two most recent 
NCICL incentive challenges rely on the Commerce Clause of the U.S. 
Constitution.  Instead, both complaints allege violations of provisions of 
the North Carolina Constitution.321  According to the NCICL, both cases 
are still pending in the North Carolina court system (one at the trial level 
and the other on appeal) as of August 2008.322 
Similarly, in Minnesota, taxpayers led by a former Lieutenant 
Governor brought suit challenging the state’s Job Opportunity Building 
Zone (JOBZ) program.323  The JOBZ program authorizes the local 
governments to grant “a variety of incentives and credits to businesses 
that relocate to or expand employment or capital investment in 
                                                          
 315. Mary Blocher, NCICL Files Lawsuit Challenging the Constitutionality of State Economic 
Subsidies to Google, Inc., (July 25, 2007), http://blog.news-record.com/staff/capblog 
/ncccl072507.doc; NC Institute for Constitutional Law, The Incentive Game: North Carolina Local 
Economic Development Incentives 8 (2007) (on file with author). 
 316. NC Institute for Constitutional Law, supra note 315, at 8. 
 317. Blocher, supra note 315. 
 318. NORTH CAROLINA INSTITUTE FOR CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—Case Status Report, 
http://www.ncicl.org/case-status-report/ (last visited Aug. 27, 2008) [hereinafter Case Status 
Report]. 
 319. Complaint at 1, 9, Richards v. North Carolina, No. 07-CVS-020487 (N.C. Super. Ct.  
Dec. 20, 2007), available at http://www.ncicl.org/assets/uploads/brief/2007.12.20-rubber-tire-
complaint.pdf. 
 320. Complaint at 1–2, Haugh v. County of Durham, No. 07-CVS-6365 (N.C. Super. Ct. Dec. 
21, 2007), available at http://www.ncicl.org/assets/uploads/brief/2007.12.21-nitronex-complaint.pdf. 
 321. Id. at 8–10; Richards Compl. at 10–13. 
 322. Case Status Report, supra note 318. 
 323. See Olson v. Minnesota, 742 N.W.2d 681 (Minn. Ct. App. 2007).  See generally Chris 
Atkins & Joseph D. Henchman, The Ohio Incentives Decision and the Quest for a 21st Century Tax 
System, 40 ST. TAX NOTES 945, Doc. No. 2006-11356 (LEXIS). 
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designated zones.”324  Among their arguments, the taxpayers claimed that 
the program violated the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution 
because it is an unfair inducement to expand in the designated zones in 
Minnesota rather than in some other state.325  While recognizing that 
state taxpayer standing is broader than its federal counterpart, the Court 
of Appeals of Minnesota dismissed the suit because the lack of an injury-
in-fact deprived the challengers of standing.326  A different set of 
Minnesota taxpayers is bringing a new challenge to the JOBZ program 
that may withstand a motion to dismiss.  Because they “directly compete 
with businesses receiving benefits under JOBZ,” these taxpayers claim 
they have an injury in fact.327  They “are at a competitive 
disadvantage . . . because JOBZ businesses are able to offer lower 
prices.”328 
While it has been noted that the standing rules in various state courts 
are more lenient, there is the possibility that cases filed in state courts 
will have a fate similar to the dismissed cases in North Carolina and 
Minnesota, among other states, where the state trial judges ruled that 
plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the tax incentives under the 
Commerce Clause.329  Thus, it is unclear whether the U.S. Supreme 
Court will ever send a clear message to the states on whether positive 
location incentives pass the constitutional test.330 
B. European Union 
For the purposes of this comparison, the Member State’s national 
courts serve a similar function to the American state court system.  Just 
like in the United States, the standing rules vary from Member State to 
                                                          
 324. Atkins & Henchman, supra note 323. 
 325. Id.  Taxpayers also claimed that the program violated the Minnesota Constitution in that the 
legislature “illegally contracted away its power of taxation to local development officials.”  Id. 
 326. Olson, 742 N.W.2d at 684–85.  Similarly, a former Nebraska State Senator challenged 
Nebraska’s law that gave “tax credits to companies that invest at least $3 million and create at least 
[thirty] new full-time jobs in-state.”  Atkins & Henchman, supra note 323.  The challengers 
contended that the bill promotes discrimination against small businesses and favors in-state over out-
of-state businesses.  Id.  Their challenge rested on both the Commerce Clause of the U.S. 
Constitution and the Nebraska Constitution’s guarantee of proportionate taxation.  Id.  This case was 
dismissed.  DeCamp v. Nebraska, No. CI041981 (dismissed Mar. 7, 2005). 
 327. Dale Busacker, Appeals Court Dismisses Challenge to Economic Development Program, 
47 ST. TAX NOTES 17, Doc. No. 2008-34 (2008) (LEXIS). 
 328. Id. 
 329. David Brunori, Cuno—The Right Decision?  Unfortunately, 40 ST. TAX NOTES 723, Doc. 
No. 2006-9849 (2006) (LEXIS). 
 330. If a taxpayer challenge reaches a decision on the merits in state court, a U.S. Supreme Court 
appeal is possible.  See discussion supra note 303. 
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Member State.331  Appropriate parties can go to their respective national 
courts for a determination of whether or not a particular measure 
constitutes state aid within the meaning of Article 87 of the EC Treaty.332  
The national courts are also entitled to evaluate whether a measure is an 
existing aid or a new aid.333  Finally, interested parties can bring an 
action in national court for a determination of whether or not an aid 
measure is in violation of Article 88(3) for failure to notify the 
Commission.334  This type of case consists of two parts: first, a 
determination of whether or not the measure constitutes aid, and second, 
whether proper notification has occurred.335 
In SFEI v. La Poste, the ECJ ruled that a national court may ask the 
Commission for clarification on how to interpret and apply the concept 
of aid, even during compatibility proceedings.336  If the aid is found to be 
in violation of Article 88(3), the national court then refers that case to the 
Commission for a decision regarding the compatibility of the measure 
with the common market.337  Even if the Commission finds the aid to be 
compatible, recovery of aid from the recipients can still be mandated by 
the national courts for the notification violation.338  National courts are 
required to provide for all appropriate remedies to protect individual 
rights that have been violated due to unlawful aid.339 
The Commission has exclusive jurisdiction to decide whether or not 
state aid is compatible with the common market and the EC Treaty.340   
 
 
                                                          
 331. RICHARD S. KAY, STANDING TO RAISE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES: A COMPARATIVE 
ANALYSIS, reprinted in STANDING TO RAISE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES: COMPARATIVE 
PERSPECTIVES, at 1 (Richard S. Kay ed., 2005). 
 332. CHRISTOPHER BELLAMY ET AL., EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW OF COMPETITION 1271 
(P.M. Roth ed., 5th ed. 2001). 
 333. Id. 
 334. DESPINA SCHINA, STATE AIDS UNDER THE EEC TREATY ARTICLES 92 TO 94, at 139 (1987) 
(indicating that the Commission relies on complaints from other Member States, third parties, and 
other sources to learn of violations); see European Commission, Notice on Cooperation Between 
National Courts and the Commission in the State Aid Field, 1995 O.J. (C 312) 8, 9 [hereinafter EC 
Notice on Cooperation] (“National courts are responsible for the protection of rights and the 
enforcement of duties, usually at the behest of private parties.”). 
 335. EC Notice on Cooperation, supra note 334, at 11. 
 336. Case C-39/94, 1996 E.C.R. I-3547. 
 337. EC Notice on Cooperation, supra note 334, at 9. 
 338. Case C-39/94, SFEI v. La Poste, 1996 E.C.R. I-3547, ¶ 43. 
 339. BELLAMY ET AL., supra note 332, at 1272. 
 340. Case 78/76, Steinike und Wenlig v. Germany, 1977 E.C.R. 595.  The court held that the 
purpose of Article 88 was to keep aid under the Commission’s constant scrutiny and that is the 
Commission’s responsibility to initiate the procedure that might result in a finding of 
incompatibility.  Id. 
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Article 88(3) states: 
 The Commission shall be informed, in sufficient time to enable it to 
submit its comments, of any plans to grant or alter aid.  If it considers 
that any such plan is not compatible with the common market having 
regard to Article 87, it shall without delay initiate the procedure 
provided for in paragraph 2.  The Member State concerned shall not put 
its proposed measures into effect until this procedure has resulted in a 
final decision.341 
After the Commission is notified of a Member State’s planned 
introduction of new state aid, it makes a preliminary examination of the 
offered plan.342  The Commission can make one of three determinations 
regarding the proposed aid: (1) that the measure does not constitute aid; 
(2) that the proposal is state aid and nonetheless is compatible with the 
common market and the EC Treaty; or (3) that the measure is 
incompatible with the common market and the EC Treaty.343  If the 
Commission has doubts as to the compatibility of the measure, it must 
commence formal investigation under Article 88(2).344 
If, after the Commission is informed of a Member State’s plan to 
offer aid, the Commission considers that the plan is incompatible with 
the goal of a unified internal market, it immediately begins the procedure 
provided for in paragraph two.345  The Member State concerned must 
delay the effective date of its proposed measures until this procedure has 
resulted in a final decision.346 
The Commission is also allowed to initiate the procedure under 
Article 88(2) of its own accord against aid already in effect.347  If the 
Commission concludes that aid already in effect, with no alterations, 
violates the common market, it must propose measures to remedy the 
situation.348  If the proposal is accepted, it is considered legally binding, 
                                                          
 341. EC Treaty, supra note 43, art. 88(3). 
 342. Procedural Council Regulation, supra note 230, art. 4(2). 
 343. Id. art. 4(2)–(4); see also BELLAMY ET AL., supra note 332, at 1271–72. 
 344. BELLAMY ET AL., supra note 332, at 1258. 
 345. EC Treaty, supra note 43, art. 88(2). 
 346. Id. art. 88(3); Procedural Council Regulation, supra note 230, art. 3; see BELLAMY ET AL., 
supra note 332, at 1253.  This requirement is known as the stand still requirement.  Procedural 
Council Regulation, supra note 230, art. 3.  Because Article 88(1) of the EC Treaty requires the 
Commission to keep existing aid under constant review, the notification requirement applies only to 
new aid or significantly altered existing aid.  Id. art. 2(1). 
 347. Procedural Council Regulation, supra note 230, art. 10(1) (authorizing the Commission to 
review a law on the basis of information that is available from “whatever source” when a state aid 
program is unlawful for failure to notify). 
 348. Id. art. 18. 
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whereas if the proposal is rejected, the Commission is able to proceed 
with formal investigations.349  If the Commission finds the aid already in 
effect to be in violation of the Treaty, it must inform the Member State of 
the violation and allow it to submit comments.350 
If the aid was put into place without notification of the Commission, 
interested parties may bring the issue before a national court who will 
rule on the alleged illegality of the aid only as it relates to failure to 
notify.351  The national court will then refer the case to the Commission 
where the compatibility of the proposal will be decided.352  In the event 
that the aid is considered valid and within the bounds of the common 
market and EC Treaty, any aid that had been taken back in accordance 
with a recovery injunction will be repaid to the recipient.  If the aid had 
been recovered because of a national court decision, the aid will not be 
returned because the obligation to comply with the notification procedure 
was still violated.353  If the Commission decides that the unlawful aid is 
contrary to the common market, the Commission will order the Member 
State in violation to recover all the aid from the recipient.354 
Formal investigation begins with a decision by the Commission 
announcing the investigation and inviting all interested parties to submit 
comments.355  If the investigation concerns new aid, the Commission 
requires that the proposed measure not be put into effect until the 
procedure is completed.356  In the event of aid already in effect, payment 
of the aid is permitted to continue.357  The formal investigation procedure 
may last up to eighteen months and culminates with one of four 
determinations: (1) the measure does not constitute aid; (2) the measure 
does constitute aid and is compatible with the common market; (3) the 
measure does constitute aid and is incompatible with the common 
market; or (4) the measure does constitute aid and will be deemed 
compatible with the common market provided that certain conditions 
imposed by the Commission are met.358 
                                                          
 349. Id. art. 19. 
 350. EC Treaty, supra note 43, art. 88(3); Procedural Council Regulation, supra note 230, art. 
17(2). 
 351. See EC Notice on Cooperation, supra note 334, at 9 (“National courts are responsible for 
the protection of rights and the enforcement of duties, usually at the behest of private parties.”). 
 352. Id. 
 353. BELLAMY ET AL., supra note 332, at 1272. 
 354. Procedural Council Regulation, supra note 230, art. 14(1). 
 355. SCHINA, supra note 334, at 148. 
 356. Procedural Council Regulation, supra note 230, art. 3. 
 357. See Rossi-Maccanico, Review of State Aid, supra note 61, at 944. 
 358. LUJA, supra note 234, at 92. 
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For example, after German unification, the promoters of small and 
medium-sized companies in the new State (Länder) were unable to find 
sufficient capital.359  Germany responded by expanding the Income Tax 
Act concessions that created tax benefits for investors in certain 
companies, and gave the Commission timely notice of the change in its 
laws. 360  The Commission initiated the investigation provided for by 
Article 88 and, at the end of the formal investigation, concluded that the 
measure Germany sought to implement did not comport with the creation 
of a common market.361  The law had the effect of reducing costs of 
financing for the small and medium-sized businesses affected.362 
European Community Courts have the jurisdiction to hear appeals of 
Commission decisions.  Today, both the ECJ and the Court of First 
Instance (CFI) have jurisdiction to hear actions brought by Member 
States against the Commission in regards to state aid.363  The ECJ and the 
CFI have concurrent jurisdiction to determine the legality of acts of the 
Council and the Commission pursuant to a grant from Article 230.364 
The CFI has jurisdiction to hear “actions brought by the Member 
States against the Council relating to acts adopted in the field of State 
aid.”365  Additionally, the CFI has jurisdiction over direct actions brought 
by individuals “against acts of Community institutions.”366  If, for 
example, a competitor felt that the Commission made a wrong decision 
with regard to whether a state program constitutes state aid, the decision 
of the Commission could be appealed to the CFI.  Likewise, a Member 
State could also appeal to the CFI.  In most cases, the ECJ hears actions 




                                                          
 359. Commission Decision 98/476, 1998 O.J. (L 212) 50, 51 (EC). 
 360. Id. at 51.  The legislation provided tax deductions for the transfer of certain fixed capital 
assets and for the sale of shares conducted by capital companies that met certain criteria, such as the 
location of their central offices in Länder or Berlin and a maximum of 250 employees at the time of 
sale.  Id. 
 361. Id. at 56. 
 362. Id. at 55. 
 363. EC Notice On Cooperation, supra note 334, at 8. 
 364. BELLAMY ET AL., supra note 332, at 1273. 
 365. The Court of Justice of the European Communities, The Court of First Instance, 
Jurisdiction, http://curia.europa.eu/en/instit/presentationfr/index_tpi.htm (last visited Aug. 28, 2008).  
The jurisdictional grant to hear such claims is not exclusive and does not preclude the ECJ from 
hearing identical claims; in fact, jurisdiction originally lay with the ECJ. 
 366. Id. 
 367. See id. (noting that the Court of Justice has exclusive jurisdiction over actions brought by a 
Member State against the Council, except for actions regarding state aid). 
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The ECJ presides over references for preliminary rulings, which are 
referred from national courts of Member States.368  When national courts 
have questions on points of interpretation of European Community law, 
they may refer those inquiries to the ECJ for a determination.369  
Decisions of the ECJ with regard to preliminary interpretations are 
binding.370  Thus, if a national court is evaluating whether a measure 
constituted state aid and has a question regarding the interpretation of 
language of the EC Treaty, that question can be referred to the ECJ.371 
The ECJ ruling in Germany v. Commission372 exemplifies the appeal 
process for state aid actions.  In this case, the German government 
appealed the decision by the Commission with regard to the tax measures 
it sought to implement.373  After a formal investigation, the Commission 
concluded that the measures were incompatible with the common 
market.374  Germany applied to the ECJ for annulment of the 
Commission’s decision, setting forth arguments that the decision 
infringed Article 190 (now Article 253 EC).375  The applicant also 
alleged errors in law by the Commission including failure to take into 
consideration the de minimis rule and improper exercise of discretion.376  
The ECJ evaluated Germany’s allegations and concluded that none of the 
pleas were well-founded; the court subsequently dismissed the claim.377  
By dismissing the claim, the ECJ required Germany to abide by the 
determination of the Commission that monies paid out under Germany’s 
program constituted illegal state aid and must be repaid.378 
In the Kingdom of Belgium and Forum 187 ASBL v. Commission, the 
ECJ joined a claim for annulment of a Commission decision brought by 
Belgium and an independent claim for annulment of the same decision 
                                                          
 368. The Court of Justice of the European Communities, http://curia.europa.eu/en/instit 
/presentationfr/cje.htm (last visited Aug. 28, 2008). 
 369. Id. 
 370. Id.  It should be noted that although questions of interpretation must be requested by 
national courts, all parties to the case, including individuals, participate in the ECJ hearing.  Id. 
 371. The ECJ does not have jurisdiction to determine whether a measure is actually state aid, 
however.  See id. 
 372. Case C-156/98, Germany v. Comm’n, 2000 E.C.R. I-6857. 
 373. Specifically, the Federal Republic of Germany was applying for an annulment of 
Commission Decision 98/476/EC of January 21, 1998 with respect to tax concessions granted under 
paragraph 52(8) of the German Income Tax Act, 1998 O.J. (L 212) 50.  Id. ¶ 1; see supra notes 359–
61 and accompanying text. 
 374. See Germany v. Comm’n, 2000 E.C.R. I-6857, ¶¶ 11, 12, 113. 
 375. See id. ¶ 16. 
 376. Id. 
 377. Id. ¶¶ 116–17. 
 378. Panayi, supra note 224, at 302. 
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brought by a group formed by interested parties.379  In 2003, the 
Commission concluded that a tax regime providing certain benefits to 
coordination centers declared beneficiaries by the Belgian government 
constituted existing aid.380  Based on that conclusion, the Commission 
declared the tax regime incompatible with the common market and 
required Belgium to comply with a number of Commission-created 
requirements designed to amend or abolish the tax regime.381 
Belgium asked the ECJ to annul parts of the decision that it felt 
conflicted with prior decisions taken by the Commission on the tax 
regimes.382  Forum 187, the representative body of a group of 
coordination centers affected by the Commission’s decision,383 sought 
the annulment of the entire order by the ECJ in a separate case from the 
country of Belgium.384  Over the objections of the Commission, the ECJ 
concluded that Forum 187 had standing to request annulment because it 
was “responsible for protecting the collective interests of coordination 
cent[er]s” affected by the contested decision.385 
The ECJ concluded that although the Commission rightly decided 
that the provisions selectively favored certain coordination centers and in 
fact constituted state aid, the decision nonetheless infringed on the 
principle of the protection of legitimate expectations created by prior 
Commission decisions.386  Furthermore, the ECJ held that the 
Commission’s decision infringed on the general principle of equal 
treatment because coordination centers, each of which had the reasonable 
expectation of lengthier transition periods for compliance, received 
disparate treatment under the contested decision.387  On those bases, the 
ECJ required that the Commission’s decision be annulled.388 
 
                                                          
 379. Joined Cases C-182/03 & C-217/03, Belgium, Forum 187 v. Comm’n, 2006 E.C.R. I-
05479, ¶¶ 1–2. 
 380. Id. ¶ 29. 
 381. Id. ¶ 32. 
 382. Id. ¶ 47. 
 383. Id. ¶ 54. 
 384. Id. ¶ 48. 
 385. Id. ¶ 56. 
 386. Id. ¶167 
 387. Id. ¶¶ 171, 173. 
 388. Id. ¶ 174.  Despite this ruling, the ECJ upheld the Commission’s decision that the 
provisions had to be rolled back and simply instructed the Commission to provide a timeframe that 
comported with the legitimate expectations of the coordination centers.  See id. ¶¶ 167, 171, 173. 
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C. Comparative Analysis 
Both the European Union and the United States have procedures in 
place to allow challenges to tax incentives that might obstruct the 
efficient functioning of the common market.  But in the European Union, 
the Member State bears the burden of proving that the proposed tax 
incentive does not distort the common market.  Any new incentive is 
subject to a formal investigation by the Commission to determine 
whether it is compatible with the common market. 
The Commission consists of members appointed by the Council for 
five-year terms.389  These Commissioners are required to act in complete 
independence of their own governments and the Council, and for the 
good of the Community.390  The Commission has features of an 
executive, legislative, and judicial branch in that it formulates 
Community policy, makes proposals to the Council, and drafts the 
detailed measures needed for their implementation.391  As the “Guardian 
of the Treaty,” the Commission must also ensure that the Treaties and 
Community law are respected and applied, and must act on any 
infringements.392 
The United States does not, however, have a governmental entity 
that is analogous to the European Commission.  The closest analogy 
would be the Multistate Tax Commission (MTC), which was formed in 
1967 by the states “in response to the threat of federal legislation to 
restrict and regulate state business taxation.”393  Its purpose is “to study 
                                                          
 389. EC Treaty, supra note 43, arts. 213, 215.  “Pursuant to the Treaty of Nice, the five largest 
States lost on Nov. 1 their traditional second Commissioner, so that the 2004–09 Commission 
initially had [twenty-five] members, increasing to [twenty-seven] Commissioners after Bulgaria and 
Romania joined on Jan.1, 2007.”  BERMANN ET AL., EUROPEAN UNION LAW 5 (Roger J. Goebel ed., 
2d ed. Supp. 2007) [hereinafter GOEBEL SUPPLEMENT, EUROPEAN UNION LAW].  “Under Article 
214(2) of the EC Treaty, the Parliament must provide a ‘vote of approval’ to the Commission ‘as a 
body’ before the Council can appoint the Commission.”  Id. at 6. 
 390. EC Treaty, supra note 43, art. 213; Treaty Establishing a Single Council and a Single 
Commission of the European Communities, art. 10(2) 1967 O.J. (152); BERMANN ET AL., supra note 
54, at 44; see T. C. HARTLEY, THE FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 11–12 (2d ed. 
1988) (describing decision-making within the Commission). 
 391. See EC Treaty, supra note 43, art. 211.  In 2005, the Commission proposed drafts “for 411 
proposals for legislation and decisions” and issued 288 reports, recommendations and studies.  
GOEBEL SUPPLEMENT, EUROPEAN UNION LAW, supra note 389, at 4.  “Exercising its delegated 
regulatory powers, the Commission adopted 602 regulations, 44 directives and 610 decisions in 
2002, and 648 regulations, 61 directives and 560 decisions in 2003.”  Id. at 4–5. 
 392. See EC Treaty, supra note 43, art. 226; BERMANN ET AL., supra note 54, at 46.  “In its role 
of ‘guardian of the Treaties,’ the Commission has on average commenced around 1500 infringement 
proceedings annually against Member States in 2002–06.”  GOEBEL SUPPLEMENT, EUROPEAN 
UNION LAW, supra note 389, at 5. 
 393. Sullivan, supra note 200, at 422; see W. Bartley Hildreth et al., Interstate Tax Uniformity 
and the Multistate Tax Commission, 58 NAT’L TAX J. 575–77 (2005) (describing the origins of the 
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state tax issues and to recommend uniform tax laws and regulations to 
the states.”394  This entity was not congressionally-sanctioned and does 
not have binding regulatory authority.395 
Appropriate parties have access to a Member State’s national court 
system as well as to the Commission.  Although the Commission has 
exclusive jurisdiction to decide whether or not state aid is compatible 
with the common market and the EC Treaty,396 the national courts have 
the authority to determine whether or not a certain proposal constitutes 
state aid;397 they are also entitled to evaluate whether a measure is an 
existing aid or a new aid.398  Furthermore, the Commission may bring a 
Member State to the ECJ.399 
In the United States, it appears that the standing doctrine is 
effectively keeping most parties from challenging the various states’ tax 
incentives.  In Cuno, the plaintiffs were taxpayers of the jurisdictions 
losing revenue from the state franchise tax credit and property tax 
exemptions challenged in this case as violations of the Commerce 
Clause.400  They claimed standing “in their capacities as state and 
municipal taxpayers.”401  The Supreme Court held that they lacked 
standing.402 
Some commentators believe that the standing rules are less stringent 
in the state courts.403  However, in North Carolina, when taxpayers 
brought suit challenging the $279 million corporate, franchise, income, 
property, and sales and use tax-incentive package given to Dell Inc. to 
build in Winston-Salem, the North Carolina Superior Court dismissed the 
                                                                                                                       
MTC). 
 394. Sullivan, supra note 200, at 422. 
 395. However, it was found to be constitutional.  Hildreth et al., supra note 393, at 577 (citing 
U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm’n, 434 U.S. 452 (1978)). 
 396. Case 78/76, Steinike und Wenlig v. Germany, 1977 E.C.R. 595 (holding that the purpose of 
Article 88 was to keep aid under the constant scrutiny of the Commission and that a finding of 
incompatibility was to be a result of a procedure that is the Commission’s responsibility to initiate). 
 397. BELLAMY ET AL., supra note 332, at 1271. 
 398. Id. 
 399. The EC Treaty provides: 
If, after giving notice to the parties concerned to submit their comments, the Commission 
finds that aid granted by a State . . . is not compatible with the common market having 
regard to Article 87, . . . it shall decide that the State concerned shall abolish or alter such 
aid . . . .  If the State concerned does not comply with this decision within the prescribed 
time, the Commission or any other interested State may, in derogation from the 
provisions of Articles 226 and 227, refer the matter to the Court of Justice direct. 
EC Treaty, supra note 43, art. 88(2). 
 400. DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 337 (2006). 
 401. Respondents’ Brief at 7, Cuno, 547 U.S. 332 (Nos. 04-1704 and 04-1724). 
 402. Cuno, 547 U.S. at 346. 
 403. See supra note 291. 
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complaint due to lack of standing.404  The same fate has befallen cases 
filed in Minnesota and Nebraska.405 
Furthermore, even when standing is not a barrier to consideration of 
these issues, there is no guarantee that the courts will find a violation of 
the dormant Commerce Clause as demonstrated by the Sixth Circuit’s 
decision in DIRECTV, Inc. v. Treesh.406  In this case, “the satellite 
companies [sought] a permanent injunction against certain provisions 
recently added to Kentucky’s revenue statutes that afford[ed] cable 
television operators credits and other relief from state taxes assessed 
against both cable companies and the satellite companies;” the provisions 
were added through amendments made to Kentucky’s tax laws in 
2005.407  Neither the cable nor the satellite companies were subject to the 
Kentucky state sales tax prior to these amendments.408  Furthermore, the 
satellite companies are exempt from all local taxes and fees pursuant to 
federal law, whereas the cable companies were paying franchise fees to 
the applicable local government for the use of a public right-of-way.409 
Under the new law that became effective on January 1, 2006, there is 
a 3% excise tax on the sales price charged for cable or satellite broadcast 
service and a 2.4% tax on the provider’s gross revenues in Kentucky.410  
As part of these changes, local governments are no longer permitted to 
assess franchise fees on the cable companies and instead receive a 
proportionate share of the revenues raised from the state excise and gross 
revenue taxes.411  But if the cable company actually pays such a franchise 
fee, it is entitled to a credit against these new state taxes.412 
The satellite companies argued that the provisions of the Kentucky 
tax law providing the cable companies with “credits against the state 
excise and gross revenues taxes and relief from franchise fees 
unconstitutionally discriminate against interstate commerce in violation 
                                                          
 404. See  supra text accompanying notes 311–14. 
 405. See supra notes 323–28 and accompanying text. 
 406. 487 F.3d 471, 481 (6th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1876 (2008); see also 
Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 614–29 (1981) (upholding a state’s 
transparent and politically controversial attempt to shift tax burdens to outsiders by simultaneously 
reducing various in-state taxes and increasing a coal severance tax that out-of-state consumers 
principally paid, at least in the short run). 
 407. DIRECTV, 487 F.3d at 473; see Frank Shaforth, Calling for State Tax Innovation, 44 ST. 
TAX NOTES 977, DOC. NO. 2007-14465 (2007) (LEXIS) (analyzing the DIRECTV decision). 
 408. DIRECTV, 487 F.3d at 474. 
 409. Id.  These franchise fees were “typically five percent of gross revenue within the franchise 
area.”  Id. 
 410. Id. at 475. 
 411. Id. 
 412. Id. 
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of the Commerce Clause.”413  They alleged that the cable companies are 
receiving a tax preference because although the cable companies must 
also pay the new taxes, they receive relief from some of their operating 
costs—namely the franchise fees previously paid for access to public-
rights-of-way.414  According to the satellite companies, the practical 
effect of this “tax and subsidy” approach constitutes discrimination 
against interstate commerce.415 
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s grant 
of the Commissioner of the Kentucky Department of Revenue’s motion 
to dismiss, as it was unable to find that the Kentucky statute would 
discriminate against interstate commerce in its practical operation.416  
The court distinguished this case from West Lynn Creamery v. Healy by 
stating that the right to use rights-of-ways without local taxes or fees was 
not a direct monetary subsidy.417  Furthermore, the court believed that 
because cable services and satellite broadcast services are two distinct 
“goods,” there was not the same “purpose and effect” found in West 
Lynn Creamery “‘to divert market share’ from an out-of-state good to an 
identical in-state good.”418  “States must be allowed, and even 
encouraged, to work ‘to attract business by creating an environment 
conducive to economic activity.’”419  Regardless of whether I disagree 
with the analysis in this case, it is reasonably clear to me that the 
Commission would have found state aid present in this case. 
The most analogous ECJ case is probably Italian Republic v. 
Commission.420  Italy introduced a tax credit for Italian truckers and a 
compensatory payment for non-Italian truckers from within the 
Community for the 1993 and 1994 tax years based on a percentage of the 
actual cost of fuel and lubricants consumed driving over Italian 
                                                          
 413. Id. 
 414. Id. at 476. 
 415. Id. at 476, 478 (citing W. Lynn Creamery v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 201 (1994)).  “In general, 
a challenged credit or exemption will fail Commerce Clause scrutiny if it discriminates on its face, 
or if, on the basis of a ‘sensitive, case-by-case analysis of purposes and effects,’ the provision ‘will 
in its practical operation work discrimination against interstate commerce . . . ,’ by ‘providing a 
direct commercial advantage to local business.’”  Id. (quoting W. Lynn Creamery, 512 U.S. at 201 
and Bacchus Imps. Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 268 (1984)). 
 416. Id. at 481.  The U.S. Supreme Court denied an appeal of the Sixth Circuit decision on April 
14, 2008.  DIRECTV, Inc. v. Treesh, 128 S. Ct. 1876, 1876 (2008). 
 417. DIRECTV, 487 F.3d at 480. 
 418. Id. 
 419. Id. at 481 (citation omitted). 
 420. Case C-6/97, Italian Republic v. Comm’n, 1999 E.C.R. I-2981 (application for the 
annulment of Commission Decision 97/270/EC of Oct. 22, 1996 on a tax credit scheme introduced 
by Italy for truckers, 1997 O.J. (L 106) 22). 
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territory.421  The Italian truckers were able to deduct this credit from 
either their income taxes or their value added tax (VAT).422  Italy failed 
to implement any detailed rules for granting the compensatory payments 
to the non-Italian truckers.423  The ECJ agreed with the Commission’s 
decision that the tax scheme was incompatible with the common market 
as it did constitute state aid and it did not meet any of the conditions of 
the permitted exceptions.424 
V. LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION AND A 
RECOMMENDED PROPOSAL 
European Union state aid policy enables Member States to resist 
protectionist pleas from their companies.  The European Union is 
experiencing a downward trend in the use of tax incentives and virtually 
no use of the targeted tax incentives utilized so widely by the American 
States due to the procedures that have been put in place.  What are the 
options for the United States given our longstanding policy of no 
national subsidy control?425 
A. The Congress 
Although the Commerce Clause confers to Congress the authority to 
regulate state tax competition, Congress has for the most part declined to 
exercise such authority.426  However, occasional congressional 
interventions occur, such as in 1976, when “to prevent states from 
imposing cumulative and potentially destructive taxes on interstate 
businesses such as railroads and airlines,” Congress passed the Railroad 
Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976.427  This law 
                                                          
 421. Id. ¶¶ 2, 4. 
 422. Id. ¶ 3. 
 423. See id. ¶ 30 (“[I]n the absence of any provisions laying down detailed rules for granting the 
stated compensatory payments, road hauliers who are nationals of other Member States could not in 
any event usefully avail themselves of the right to claim such payments.”). 
 424. Id. ¶¶ 8, 17. 
 425. There are two exceptions, however.  The first exception is the prohibition of discriminatory 
subsidies that impose a burden on interstate commerce.  See supra notes 11–15 and accompanying 
text.  The second exception is the requirements of the GATT/WTO.  This topic is beyond the scope 
of this Article.  See Avi-Yonah, supra note 41, at 1666 (“GATT Article XVI . . . expressly prohibits 
the use of any subsidy ‘on the export of any product . . . which subsidy results in the sale of such 
product for export at a price lower than the comparable price charged for the like product to buyers 
in the domestic market.’”). 
 426. See generally Enrich, Saving the States, supra note 27, at 405–06. 
 427. Field, supra note 10, at 1213. 
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prohibited states from placing higher tax rates on property owned by 
railroads than on property owned by other commercial enterprises within 
the same jurisdiction.428  More recently, in 1998, Congress passed the 
Internet Tax Freedom Act (ITFA), a law intended to curb state taxes on 
an “emerging technology” and “achieve neutrality in the taxation of 
electronic commerce.”429  In 2004, the Internet Tax Nondiscrimination 
Act (ITNA) expanded the definitions of “Internet access” and “tax on 
Internet access.”430  The Internet Tax Freedom Act Amendments Act of 
2007 extended the moratorium that had been imposed by the ITNA 
through November 2014.431 
This is another situation where Congress should intervene.  
Specifically, I am recommending that Congress pass legislation that 
would provide an alternative to traditional taxpayer-challenge lawsuits, 
thus bypassing the obstacle of standing after Cuno.  One way Congress 
could accomplish this is through a qui tam statute, allowing concerned 
citizens to file suits on behalf of the public interest.432  Thus, a qui tam 
law allows “ordinary citizens to act as private attorneys general.”433  By 
providing concerned taxpayers with a qui tam option, Congress could 
avoid the issue of standing while encouraging enforcement of the 
Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution. 
Governments have used qui tam for centuries to maximize the 
enforcement of laws.434  For example, England used qui tam throughout 
the Middle Ages to address the “conflict of interest between local and 
national officials . . . in order to ensure that the national laws would be 
enforced.”435  Currently, the most significant example of qui tam in the 
United States is the False Claims Act,436 which provides citizens with the 
power to bring a lawsuit against a person or entity involved in fraud 
perpetrated against the federal government.437  The law gives citizen 
                                                          
 428. Id. at 1213 n.13 (citing 49 U.S.C. § 11503 (1976)). 
 429. Id. at 1213; see Kaye, Discrimination, supra note 42, at 208.  The Act ended up costing the 
states “billions in foregone revenues.”  Id. 
 430. Kaye, Discrimination, supra note 42, at 209. 
 431. Internet Tax Freedom Act Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-108, 121 Stat. 1024 
(2007). 
 432. E.g., R. Harrison Smith, A Key Time for Qui Tam: The False Claims Act and Alabama, 58 
ALA. L. REV. 1199, 1201 (2007) (citing Christopher C. Frieden, Protecting the Government’s 
Interests: Qui Tam Actions Under the False Claims Act and the Government’s Right to Veto 
Settlements of Those Actions, 47 EMORY L.J. 1041, 1041 (1998)). 
 433. Id. (citing Frieden, supra note 432). 
 434. Id. at 1200–01. 
 435. Id. at 1201. 
 436. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–31 (2000). 
 437. Smith, supra note 432, at 1201. 
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relators438 a financial incentive to expose fraud by allowing them to keep 
a portion of any funds recovered as a result of the litigation.439  The False 
Claims Act has proven to be a successful and effective means of 
combating fraud that would have otherwise drained taxpayer 
resources.440 
The False Claims Act could provide a model for a similar qui tam 
statute to empower concerned taxpayers to challenge state tax incentive 
programs, which are also draining taxpayer resources.  As the states are 
voluntarily colluding with businesses to offer the challenged incentives, 
they are unlikely to enforce the restrictions of the dormant Commerce 
Clause themselves.  Thus, qui tam would be an appropriate tool to use in 
this situation. 
A model statute would give citizens the power to bring a suit, with 
the guarantee that they would receive a portion of any state tax 
expenditures that are returned as a result of the litigation by the company 
that received the unconstitutional targeted state tax incentive.  This 
would provide an incentive for citizens to police state tax incentives and 
could discourage companies from seeking or accepting them because of 
the increased risk posed by qui tam litigation.441  By discouraging future 
abuses of tax incentive programs and enabling taxpayer challenges to  
 
                                                          
 438. Citizens who bring actions pursuant to a qui tam statute are referred to as relators.  Id. 
(citing 1 JOHN T. BOESE, CIVIL FALSE CLAIMS & QUI TAM ACTIONS 1–4 (3d ed. Supp. 2007)). 
 439. United States, ex Rel. Springfield Terminal Ry. Co. v. Quinn, 14 F.3d 645, 649 (D.C. Cir. 
1994). 
 440. Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., Whistleblowers and Qui Tam for Tax, 61 TAX LAW. 357, 368 (2008). 
 441. Ventry has suggested a similar qui tam statute to enforce the Internal Revenue Code against 
tax evaders in his article, Whistleblowers and Qui Tam for Tax: 
Evidence suggests that adding a qui tam provision to the tax whistleblower statute would 
deter noncompliance and enhance enforcement.  First . . . the threat of qui tam lawsuits 
adds real as well as perceived downside risk to the compliance calculus . . . .  It increases 
the probability of detection and subsequent prosecution, which researchers have shown 
corresponds particularly strongly with increased tax compliance.  Second, if the 
government publicizes the threat of qui tam lawsuits and the successful prosecution of tax 
cheats, research also indicates that such publicity could discourage noncompliant 
behavior and at the same time reinforce compliant behavior.  Third, the qui tam approach 
might actually encourage more private persons to come forward with information of 
wrongdoing than a pure bounty system for two additional reasons: some would-be 
informants might be comforted knowing that the federal government will help prosecute 
the lawsuit they initiate, while other informants might be comforted knowing that they 
will have an opportunity to proceed with the action on their own if the government does 
not act on what the informant believes to be unique and important information.  Fourth, 
the mixture of bounties and qui tam lawsuits seems to be working effectively in the 
[False Claims Act] context, and the foregoing discussion indicates that the same mixture 
could work even more effectively in the tax context. 
Id. at 383–84. 
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existing state tax incentive programs, qui tam legislation would be a step 
in the right direction for the United States. 
However, in response to the constitutional challenge raised in Cuno, 
some members of Congress introduced the Economic Development Act 
of 2005 in the U.S. House and Senate.442  It allowed for “any State to 
provide to any person for economic development purposes tax incentives 
that otherwise would be the cause or source of discrimination against 
interstate commerce under the Commerce Clause of the United States 
Constitution, except as otherwise provided by law.”443  As demonstrated 
by this congressional response to the potential finding of 
unconstitutionality of a state tax credit, it appears that Congress is only 
interested in legislation that reduces taxes.  It is unlikely that Congress 
will be willing to prevent a “race to the bottom” with any federal 
legislation.  As I have written previously, unfortunately, when state 
taxpayers turn to Congress, the result is that no one pays taxes.444  The 
qui tam solution also requires that the Judiciary participate in the solution 
to this problem by finding the targeted state tax incentive programs 
unconstitutional. 
B. The Judiciary 
Given the historic reluctance of Congress to intervene in state 
taxation, the U.S. Supreme Court has been forced from time to time to 
examine issues similar to those now confronting the European Union.  
Thus, the U.S. Supreme Court, like the ECJ, has intervened on occasion 
with state tax regimes through its jurisprudence.  For example, in 
Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, the Court struck down a Hawaiian law 
that granted a tax exemption for certain locally produced liquors.445  The 
Court concluded that because the law had both “the purpose and effect of 
discriminating in favor of local products,” it violated the Commerce 
Clause.446  The Court rejected Hawaii’s argument that the law was not 
                                                          
 442. H.R. 2471, 109th Cong. (2005); S. 1066, 109th Cong. (2005).  In the 110th Congress, the 
Senate has reintroduced the bill.  S. 914, 110th Cong. (2007).  As of August 19, 2007, S. 914 had 
seven co-sponsors.  See Martin A. Sullivan, State Tax Incentives: Who Will Clean Up the Mess?, 40 
ST. TAX NOTES 331, Doc. No. 2006-6643 (2006) (LEXIS). 
 443. ABA TAX SECTION, SALT Incentives—Will They Last in Light of Cuno? 9 (2006).  
“Because the Supreme Court dismissed the constitutional challenge in Cuno, it is unlikely this 
legislation will move forward until similar credits and incentives are endangered at a point in the 
future.”  Id. 
 444. Tracy A. Kaye, Show Me the Money: Congressional Limitations on State Tax Sovereignty, 
35 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 149, 166–67 (1998). 
 445. 468 U.S. 263, 273 (1984). 
 446. Id. 
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intended to burden out-of-state suppliers of alcohol but instead to benefit 
local business.447  In doing so, the Court concluded that such 
discriminatory laws constituted nothing more than economic 
protectionism and thus were violative of a “central tenet of the 
Commerce Clause.”448 
Unfortunately, I do not believe that the Judiciary is the solution to 
this problem either because unlike the ECJ, the U.S. Supreme Court is 
not obligated to hear every case.449  The Supreme Court only grants 
certiorari in about 150 cases of the approximately 10,000 petitions filed 
per Term.450  The Court’s recent denials of certiorari show a lack of 
enthusiasm for state tax cases,451 even though the Court’s review is 
particularly significant in a constitutional challenge to a state tax system 
in order to send appropriate messages to the state legislatures.452 
Furthermore, the respondents’ brief to the Supreme Court in Cuno 
stated that the Ohio ITC was paradigmatic of a state tax provision that 
facially discriminated against interstate commerce by giving a direct 
advantage to in-state activity.453  The respondents stated that petitioners’ 
novel interpretations of the Commerce Clause did not identify a single 
case in which the Supreme Court had upheld a measure that provided 
preferential tax treatment conditioned on in-state economic activity.454  
Yet, when the Supreme Court of the United States “granted certiorari to 
consider whether the franchise tax credit violates the Commerce 
Clause,”455 the Court also asked the parties “to address whether plaintiffs 
have standing to challenge the franchise tax credit in this litigation.”456 
                                                          
 447. Id. at 276. 
 448. Id. 
 449. The ECJ is obligated under the Treaty to take every case that is referred to it under Article 
234 of the EC Treaty. 
 450. The Justices’ Caseload, http://www.supremecourtus.gov/about/justicecaseload.pdf (last 
visited Aug. 28, 2008). 
 451. For recent examples see Lanco, Inc. v. Director, Division of Taxation, 908 A.2d 176 (N.J. 
2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 2974 (2007) (holding that New Jersey may subject a foreign 
corporation to the Corporation Business Tax that lacks physical presence in the state but derives 
income from a licensing agreement with a local retailer) and Tax Commissioner of West Virginia v. 
M.B.N.A. America Bank, N.A., 640 S.E.2d 226 (W. Va. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 2997 (2007) 
(held that West Virginia may subject a foreign corporation to business franchise and income taxes 
when the company has a substantial economic presence in the state in contrast with merely a 
physical one). 
 452. William J. Quirk & R. Rhett Shaver, Does Congress Put Federalism at Risk When It Limits 
the States’ Power to Tax?, 21 ST. TAX NOTES 649, 650–51 (2001) (citations omitted). 
 453. Respondents’ Brief at 8, DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332 (2006) (Nos. 04-
1704 and 04-1724). 
 454. Id. at 9. 
 455. Cuno, 547 U.S. at 340. 
 456. Id. 
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The Supreme Court ultimately concluded that “state taxpayers have 
no standing under Article III to challenge state tax or spending decisions 
simply by virtue of their status as taxpayers.”457  Chief Justice John G. 
Roberts Jr., writing for a unanimous court, found that “[b]ecause 
plaintiffs have no standing to challenge that credit, the lower courts erred 
by considering their claims against it on the merits.”458  The Supreme 
Court, therefore, vacated the judgment of the Sixth Circuit in part, and 
remanded the cases “for dismissal of plaintiffs’ challenge to the franchise 
tax credit.”459 
In reaching its holding, the Court also reasoned that Flast v. Cohen460 
was inapplicable due to the fact that “[w]hatever rights plaintiffs have 
under the Commerce Clause, they are fundamentally unlike” those rights 
under the Establishment Clause.461  In denying that this Commerce 
Clause challenge was analogous to the Establishment Clause challenge in 
Flast,462 the Supreme Court has already rejected the most creative 
argument that would have allowed them to hear the Cuno case. 
Besides the seemingly insurmountable barrier that has been erected 
to keep challenges of state tax incentives from being heard, it was not 
clear that the Supreme Court would have found the Ohio tax credit 
unconstitutional even if they had agreed to consider the merits of the 
case.  In fact, some commentators were predicting a finding of 
constitutionality by the Supreme Court.463 
                                                          
 457. Id. at 346. 
 458. Id. at 354. 
 459. Id.; see Jennifer Carr & Cara Griffith, Will There Ever be an Opinion on the 
Constitutionality of Tax Incentives?, 40 ST. TAX NOTES 619, 622, Doc. No. 2006-9524 (2006) 
(LEXIS) (citing e-mail from Peter Enrich (May 15, 2006)) (lamenting that this conclusion seems 
fundamentally unfair since defendants forced the plaintiffs into federal court and then successfully 
claimed plaintiffs had no right to be there); Biggins, supra note 309, at 11 (stating that “the U.S. 
Supreme Court never did reach the merits of the case—i.e., whether states can use tax incentives to 
attract or retain jobs and investment—leaving the market unrequited in its desire for guidance and 
predictability”). 
 460. 392 U.S. 83 (1968).  Flast requires a taxpayer to establish “a logical link between 
[taxpayer] status and the type of legislative enactment attacked” and “a nexus between [taxpayer] 
status and the precise nature of the constitutional infringement alleged” for standing to sue as a 
taxpayer.  Id. at 102. 
 461. Cuno, 547 U.S. at 347. 
 462. Id. at 349. 
 463. See, e.g., Marcia Coyle, High Court to Hear Challenge to Company Tax Breaks, NAT’L L. 
J., Feb. 10, 2006, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/ihc/PubArticleIHC.jsp?id=1139479513325 
(explaining Walter Hellerstein’s prediction that Ohio would prevail in the United States Supreme 
Court); see also Robert J. Firestone, State Investment Tax Credits Do Not Violate the Dormant 
Commerce Clause, 36 ST. TAX NOTES 189, 198, Doc. No. 2005-5621 (2005) (LEXIS) (“[The 
Supreme Court] should reverse the Sixth Circuit under its dormant Commerce Clause precedent, 
which holds that a tax violates the dormant Commerce Clause only when it has the effect of a 
tariff.”). 
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C. “Soft Law” 
Because of the difficulty of reaching unanimous agreement on EU 
tax legislation, the use of non-legislative approaches, “soft law,” has 
become accepted in the European Union.464  The European Union’s Code 
of Conduct for Business Taxation is the first example of “soft law” in the 
area of corporate taxation.465  This effort was successful in that the Code 
provided a system to tackle the issue of harmful tax competition and the 
criteria in the Code made evaluation of specific tax regimes possible.  
The method of peer review performed by the Primarolo Group was an 
innovation for tax policy.466  There is evidence of actual effects on 
Member States’ tax policies.467  “It would be politically difficult now to 
propose the same type of beggar-thy-neighbour regimes which were so 
popular up until the mid-1990s.”468 
As the Multistate Tax Commission has been somewhat successful in 
its promotion of tax uniformity,469 perhaps the promulgation of a State 
Code of Conduct analogous to the European Union’s Code of Conduct 
would be an appropriate and worthwhile project for the MTC.  The states 
have shown some willingness to cooperate when their revenue base is at 
stake as demonstrated by the Streamlined Sales Tax Project (SSTP).470 
In 1992, the Supreme Court ruled that an out-of-state vendor is not 
obligated to “collect sales taxes for states in which they (the vendors) do 
not have nexus.”471  With the growth of Internet commerce, states 
became fearful that the Court’s ruling would lead to substantial sales tax 
revenue loss, leading them to support the SSTP in its drafting of the 
Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement (“Agreement”).472  Although 
                                                          
 464. Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament and the 
Economic and Social Committee: Tax Policy in the European Union—Priorities for the Years 
Ahead, at 22–23, COM (2001) 260 final (May 23, 2001); see Rädler, supra note 223, at 423. 
 465. Claudio M. Radaelli, The Code of Conduct Against Harmful Tax Competition: Open 
Method of Coordination in Disguise?, 81 PUB. ADMIN. 513, 521 (2003). 
 466. Id. at 526. 
 467. “[R]ecent changes in The Netherlands’ intermediate royalty and interest companies, 
advance pricing agreements and advance ruling practices have been linked to the intention of the 
Dutch government to comply with the criteria listed by the code.”  Id. at 527. 
 468. Id. 
 469. Hildreth et al., supra note 393, at 583. 
 470. Karen Setze, Federal Action Necessary for State Tax Uniformity, Say National Tax 
Association Speakers, 36 ST. TAX NOTES 630, Doc. No. 2005-11376 (May 25, 2005) (LEXIS). 
 471. Steven Maguire, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE REPORT FOR CONGRESS, The 
Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement: A Brief Description, 2 (2006). 
 472. Id.  The SSTP “was created in 2000 by 43 states and the District of Columbia.”  Id.  As of 
January 1, 2008, seventeen states are in compliance with the Streamlined Sales and Use Tax 
Agreement through their laws, rules, regulations and policies, with five more states scheduled to be 
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not a perfect solution,473 it will reduce tax compliance costs and simplify 
sales and use tax administration among the member states.474 
The central focus of the SSTP and its Agreement was to simplify the 
current sales and use tax systems, relying on an optional “agreement 
among the states to collect and remit sales tax to the taxing state.”475  The 
Agreement “establishes uniform definitions for taxable goods and 
services and requires that a participating state and local government have 
only one statewide tax rate for each type of product.”476  On October 1, 
2005, the Agreement became effective when at least 11 states with more 
than “20% of the combined population of the 45 states with state sales 
taxes were deemed in ‘substantial compliance’ with the SSUTA.”477  
Afterwards, the SSTP dissolved and was replaced with the State and 
Local Advisory Council.478 
I propose the formation of a group under the auspices of the MTC to 
promulgate a State Code of Conduct for Business Taxation analogous to 
the European Union’s Code of Conduct.479  This State Code of Conduct 
would require abstention from targeted tax incentives.  At this point in 
time, I think it would be impractical to advocate the prohibition of all 
subsidies given the state autonomy issues.  However, a prohibition on 
                                                                                                                       
in compliance in the following years.  Eric Parker, Streamlined Governing Board Adds Three More 
States To Its Ranks, 46 ST. TAX NOTES 7, Doc. No. 2007-21457 (2007) (LEXIS); see 
http://www.streamlinedsalestax.org/govbrdstates.htm (providing a list of member states). 
 473. See Brian Galle, Designing Interstate Institutions: The Example of the Streamlined Sales 
and Use Tax Agreement (“SSUTA”), 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1381, 1401 (2007) (although the SSTP 
strives to create uniformity among the tax systems of its members, its goals may be hindered by the 
same influences that led state legislators to draft diverse sales tax rules because of the separate 
adoption, enforcement, and interpretation of the Agreement by each member state).  Thus, a standard 
model may transform into a diversified set of rules given the actions of state legislators, agencies, 
and courts.  Id. at 1401–11. 
 474. John A. Swain, State Sales and Use Tax Jurisdiction: An Economic Nexus Standard for the 
Twenty-First Century, 38 GA. L. REV. 343, 371–73 (2003). 
 475. Eric A. Ess, Comment, Internet Taxation without Physical Representation?: States Seek 
Solution to Stop E-Commerce Sales Tax Shortfall, 50 ST. LOUIS U. L. J. 893, 907 (2006); see 
http://www.streamlinedsalestax.org/oprules.html (last visited Aug. 26, 2008) (stating the project’s 
mission as the following: “The Streamlined Sales Tax Project will develop measures to design, test 
and implement a sales and use tax system that radically simplifies sales and use taxes.”). 
 476. Steven Maguire & Nonna A. Noto, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE REPORT FOR 
CONGRESS, Internet Taxation: Issues and Legislation in the 109th Congress, June 29, 2006, at 10, 
available at http://opencrs.cdt.org/document/RL33261. 
 477. Id. at n.26. 
 478. Id. (citing Jeffery A. Friedman & Charles Kearns, Federal Streamlined Sales Tax 
Legislation Introduced in the Senate, 39 ST. TAX NOTES 131 (2006)).  It has been noted that “large 
national chains, such as Wal-Mart and J.C. Penney, already pledged their support for the project.”  
Pamela Swidler, The Beginning of the End to a Tax-Free Internet: Developing an E-Commerce 
Clause, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 541, 564 (2006). 
 479. See Sullivan, supra note 200, at 421 (making a similar proposal based on the European 
Union as a model). 
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targeted tax incentives will still accomplish the goal of transparency and 
encourage states to compete on the basis of tax rates. 
I believe that this proposal will indirectly reduce the size of direct 
subsidies.  Take the example of the subsidy package offered 
ThyssenKrupp AG by Alabama.480  The $461 million in direct subsidies 
included land acquisition, site preparation, worker training, and road 
improvements.481  Perhaps the voters could swallow that package.  But if 
the German company was also offered an additional cash grant of $350 
million in lieu of the tax subsidy, I believe that there would have been a 
greater outcry from the Alabamans.  Actually, the check would have to 
be in excess of $350 million as the deal included a promise that the 
company will not have to pay any state corporate income tax for the next 
thirty years unless its tax liability exceeds $185 million in any year.482 
It will be harder for states to generate this large of a direct subsidy 
package given the procedural constraints that exist on appropriations.  
Relief from sales, property, income, and utility taxes by the state and 
local governments usually bypasses the budgetary process in most states.  
For example, in Connecticut, the amount spent through tax expenditures 
exceeds the amount spent in any other budgetary category.483  
Nevertheless, the state’s tax expenditure budget is not integrated into the 
budgetary process.484 
“Although tax exemptions and subsidies serve similar ends, they 
differ in important and relevant respects.”485  The Supreme Court is right 
when it comes to the different perceptions and procedural rules that 
pertain to direct expenditures versus tax expenditures.486  Explicit 
subsidies are easier to monitor than tax expenditures.487  Although 
approximately half of the states enact tax expenditure budgets,488 few 
states mandate the use of these reports in their annual budget 
processes.489 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
The provision of subsidies is firmly entrenched in the economic 
culture of our states.  Thus, outright prohibition of such subsidies is 
unrealistic.  Also as explained, even the European Union has not 
completely foregone all such state aid.  The goal of my proposal is to 
make the provision of such subsidies more transparent by taking away 
the one aid instrument—the state tax system—that is the most difficult 
for the public to understand and is the most easily hidden from scrutiny.  
The states should be encouraged to compete on the basis of tax rates, 
infrastructure, etc. 
The SSTP demonstrates that the states have the capability to solve 
this problem themselves.  The step of agreeing to a State Code of 
Conduct for Business Taxes that would require them to abstain from 
targeted tax incentives will force states that still bid for companies to use 
direct subsidies.  These subsidies are more readily understood by the 
average citizen, who will be able to demand restraint from their public 
officials if they do not perceive sufficient benefits as arising from such 
spending.  In the alternative, a qui tam statute modeled after the 
successful False Claims Act could help avoid the standing problem in 
federal courts for taxpayer challenges after Cuno.  Although these 
proposals might not prevent all corporate seduction, they will serve to 
increase public scrutiny of tax incentives. 
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